Reasoned/intuitive action :: an individual difference moderator of the attitude-behavior relationship in the 1988 U.S. presidential election. by Watters, Andrew E.
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014
1989
Reasoned/intuitive action :: an individual
difference moderator of the attitude-behavior
relationship in the 1988 U.S. presidential election.
Andrew E. Watters
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses
This thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses 1911 -
February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Watters, Andrew E., "Reasoned/intuitive action :: an individual difference moderator of the attitude-behavior relationship in the 1988
U.S. presidential election." (1989). Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014. 2152.
Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses/2152

REASONED/INTUITIVE ACTION: AN INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE
MODERATOR OF THE ATTITUDE
-BEHAVIOR RELATIONSHIP
IN THE 1988 U. S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
A Thesis Presented
by
ANDREW E. WATTERS
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
September 1989
Psychology
(c) Copyright by Andrew E. Watters
All Rights Reserved
REASONED/ INTUITIVE ACTION: AN INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE
MODERATOR OF THE ATTITUDE-BEHAVIOR RELATIONSHIP
IN THE 1988 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
A Thesis Presented
by
ANDREW E. WATTERS
Approved as to style and content by:
Icek Ajzen, Chairperson of Committee
Seymour Epscein, Member
Susan Fiske, Member
Seymour Berger, Departuf^nt Head
Psychology
DEDICATION
TO Barbara, for all her support, encouragement, and most
importantly, her love.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank my chairperson, icek Ajzen, for
his help and guidance over the course of this work. My
thanks also to committee members Seymour Epstein and Susan
Fiske for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this
thesis.
Special thanks to Celeste LeBlanc for her help in
preparing the materials for this work, and for her
assistance in entering the resulting data.
Finally, I owe a special debt of gratitude to Barbara
Watters for the countless hours she spent listening to
various ideas related to this work and commenting on each
draft as it was produced.
V
ABSTRACT
REASONED/INTUITIVE ACTION: AN INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE
MODERATOR OF THE ATTITUDE-BEHAVIOR RELATIONSHIP
IN THE 1988 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
SEPTEMBER 1989
ANDREW E. WATTERS, B.A.
, CORNELL UNIVERSITY
M.S. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Icek Ajzen
This study developed two independent, unipolar action
tendency scales: one measuring reasoned action (considering
the consequences of one's actions) and the second measuring
intuitive action (relying on 'gut-feelings' as the basis for
action)
. These scales were then used in a study of college
students' voting behavior in the 1988 U.S. Presidential
election, to assess the moderating effects of action
tendency on Ajzen' s (1985) theory of planned behavior. It
was expected that high reasoned action and low intuitive
action subjects would be better predicted because the theory
assumes that people do consider the consequences of their
behavior before acting.
Hierarchical regressions using median splits on each
scale, respectively, failed to show any consistent
moderating effect of action tendency. However, adding a
measure of attitude toward the two major presidential
candidates to the constructs of the theory of planned
behavior did show a small, but statistically significant,
vi
moderating effect. High intuitive and low reasoned action
subjects evidenced a one percent increase in variance
explained.
It was also expected that adding the construct of
perceived behavioral control should significantly increase
the prediction of election participation but not the
prediction of candidate choice. The former behavior was not
entirely under an individual's volitional control while the
latter was under volitional control. This prediction was
confirmed. In addition, perceived control significantly
increased prediction of subjects' relative intention to vote
for one candidate or the other.
The absence of action tendency moderating effects was
interpreted as evidence of the robustness of the theory of
planned behavior. The implications of the results regarding
attitude toward the candidates and the results regarding
perceived behavioral control were also discussed.
vii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Attitude-Behavi.or Relationship
The attitude construct has been, and continues to be, a
topic of much research in social psychology (see McGuire,
1986)
.
One particular focus of this research concerns the
nature of the relationship between attitudes and behavior.
As noted in another recent review of the attitude-behavior
relationship (Zanna & Fazio, 1982), investigators first
asked, is there a relationship between attitude and
behavior? A classic example of this research is La Piere's
(1934) well-known study of hotel and restaurant managers'
attitudes towards serving Chinese customers and actual
service to a Chinese couple. As these and other reviewers
note, findings in this type of research range from no
relation between attitude and behavior to almost perfect
predictability.
Next, research moved to explication of the boundary
conditions of the relationship; that is, under what
conditions does the effect hold? Given the diverse findings
of this area, this question was viewed as more informative
than the "whether" question. One focus on boundary
conditions deals with measurement issues (Ajzen & Fishbein,
1977; see Ajzen, 1982 for a recent discussion). Numerous
studies have shown a fairly sizeable and consistent
relationship between attitude and behavior. As these
authors emphasize, this strong relationship between attitude
and behavior is expected only when both are measured at the
same level of specificity. Specific attitudes may predict
specific behaviors. General attitudes are not expected to
predict specific behaviors, however, but are expected to
relate to a general behavioral tendency, as shown by
multiple behavioral measures.
A second area of boundary conditions deals with the
moderating effects of individual difference variables.
Several authors have proposed that a strong attitude-
behavior relationship occurs only for certain individuals
possessing appropriate levels of that particular moderator.
For example, level of self-consciousness, or self-focused
attention, has been shown to affect attitude-behavior
correspondence (e.g. Scheier, Buss, & Buss, 1978).
Likewise, Snyder and colleagues have advanced the construct
of self-monitoring as influencing this relationship (see
Snyder & Gangestad, 1986 for a recent discussion of this
research)
.
Low self-monitors' behavior is presumed to be
guided by internal thoughts and feelings, while high self-
monitors are susceptible to situational cues for appropriate
behavior. Thus high attitude-behavior correspondence is
expected for low self-monitors, but not for high self-
monitors.
Much of the recent work on attitude and the attitude-
behavior relationship has shown that people act in a
2
reasoned manner (e.g. Fishbein & Ajzen's theory of reasoned
action, 1975; Ajzen's theory of planned behavior, 1985).
Ajzen (1985) summarized this perspective by noting that
"human beings usually behave in a sensible manner; [and]
that they take account of available information and
implicitly or explicitly consider the implications of their
actions..." (p. 12). However, it is possible that not all
individuals consider the implications of their actions to
the same degree. That is, some individuals may act more
intuitively, basing their actions more on their "gut
feelings" than on detailed consideration of the implications
of their actions. For these individuals, a reasoned action
approach may not be as predictive as it is for individuals
who do consider their actions carefully. This suggests that
an individual difference measure of an individual's tendency
toward reasoned or intuitive action (Ajzen, personal
communication, 1987) may have a moderating effect on the
relationships in the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen,
1985)
.
The theory of planned behavior is discussed in the next
section. Following that discussion, relevant research on
other individual difference moderators is reviewed.
Finally, the goals of this study, along with the specific
hypotheses to be tested, are presented in the concluding
section of this chapter.
3
The Theory of pi ;.nned Beh^^v-io-r
The theory of planned behavior is an extension of the
original theory of reasoned action developed by Fishbein and
Ajzen (1975; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). The major difference
between the two is that the theory of planned behavior adds
the construct of perceived behavioral control. The original
theory of reasoned action applied to behaviors that were
presumed to be entirely under an individual's control. By
including perceived behavioral control, the new theory
extended its applicability to behaviors that are only partly
under volitional control.
According to the theory of planned behavior, the
immediate determinant of an individual's behavior is that
individual's intention (I) to perform or not to perform the
behavior. Intention is determined by three variables: the
individual's attitude toward the behavior (ATT), the
subjective norms (SN) or perceived social pressures to
perform or not to perform the behavior, and the individual's
perceived control over performing the behavior (PBC)
.
Perceived control has also been shown to predict behavior
directly when the behavior is influenced by factors beyond
an individual's control (Ajzen & Madden, 1986). Figure 1
presents the relationships among these constructs.
Direct measures of these constructs can be obtained,
and in many studies where simple description of the
phenomenon is the goal, these are sufficient. For example,
attitude is inferred from the rating of the behavior on a
4
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Figure 1. Constructs in the theory of planned behavior.
number of evaluative semantic differential scales (Osgood,
Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957), such as good-bad and pleasant-
unpleasant. Subjective norms are assessed by asking, in
general, how motivated the individual is to comply with what
important people in his or her life think he or she should
do. Responses are on a 7-point "not at all" to
"very much" scale. Perceived control is assessed directly
by questions such as, how much control do you think you have
over performing or not performing the behavior? The 7-point
response scale is "no control" to "complete control." To go
beyond description and improve understanding, however, it is
necessary to obtain belief-based measures in addition to
these direct measures.
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Assessing the underlying beliefs makes it possible to
increase the understanding of the bases for the attitude,
subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control constructs
(see Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980, pp. 90-91). Because these
constructs are viewed as the immediate determinants of
intention, the underlying beliefs do not contribute
independently to the prediction of the intention. That is
to say, the effects of beliefs on intention are mediated by
these three constructs. Thus, no increase in prediction
will be obtained with the inclusion of beliefs; however, an
increase in understanding is gained from knowledge of the
bases of the attitude, subjective norm, and perceived
control constructs.
As shown above in Figure 1, attitude, subjective norm,
and perceived behavioral control are in turn determined by
an individual's salient beliefs, in assessing these beliefs
it is first necessary to conduct a pilot study where a group
of respondents, representative of participants in the actual
study, list salient outcomes associated with performing or
not performing the behavior, important reference groups
concerned with performing or not performing the behavior,
and factors that could facilitate or hinder performing the
behavior, respectively. The most frequent responses from
each of these three lists then form the set of salient
beliefs used in the primary study.
The belief-based attitude measure is derived from an
individual's evaluation of these salient outcomes.
6
multiplied by the estimated likelihood of occurrence of each
outcome. For example, the outcome "By voting in the 1988
presidential election I will have my opinion counted" would
be rated on a 7-point "good-bad" scale. The likelihood of
this outcome occurring would then be obtained on a 7-point
"likely-unlikely" scale.
The belief-based normative measure is obtained by
asking how motivated the individual is to comply with what
important reference groups (e.g. parents, friends, teachers)
think about that person's performing or not performing the
behavior, multiplied by the perceived likelihood that these
groups think the individual should or should not perform the
behavior. Thus, an example of motivation to comply would be
"Generally speaking, how much do you do what your parents
want you to do?," rated on a 7-point "not at all" to "very
much" scale. The corresponding likelihood estimate would
come from "My parents would approve of my voting in the 1988
presidential election," also rated on a 7-point "not at all-
very much" scale.
Belief-based measures of control are found from the
individual's rating of the likelihood of occurrence of
facilitating or hindering factors, multiplied by the
factors' perceived facilitating or inhibiting potential.
For example, "How likely is it that you will lack time to
vote in the 1988 presidential election?" would be rated on a
7-point "likely-unlikely" scale. Facilitating or inhibiting
potential would come from "To what extent would lack of time
7
make it difficult for you personally to vote in the 1988
presidential election?, rated on a 7-point "not at all
difficult-extremely difficult" scale.
It is clear that the theory of planned behavior assumes
that individuals consider the consequences of their actions.
High predictability should be obtained for individuals who
use this approach. However, it is also possible that some
individuals may use a more intuitive basis for their
actions. The theory may not produce high predictability for
these individuals. This differential predictability is the
main focus of the proposed reasoned/ intuitive action
tendency investigated in this study.
Individual Difference Research
While the theory of planned behavior and the theory of
reasoned action have both received considerable support in
numerous contexts (see Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980, for a summary
of the theory of reasoned action) , the relationships
reflected in theory were not perfect. Many factors can
influence these relationships, but for present purposes the
focus is on individual differences in the proposed tendency
toward reasoned versus intuitive action. Support for this
approach can be found in a number of sources.
Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory
For example, Epstein's cognitive-experiential self-
theory of personality (e.g. 1985) postulated three
8
conceptual systems in the individual. Two are of importance
here, the rational and the experiential. The rational
system largely involves conscious reasoning that is also
believed to underlie the theory of planned behavior. The
experiential system operates primarily at a preconscious
level of awareness, is closely related to immediate
affective experience, and is less reflective than the
rational system. It includes thoughts and imagery of which
individuals are not necessarily aware, but to which they can
attend with instruction, it may be a system such as this
that underlies the more intuitive action not captured by the
theory of planned behavior. Indeed, as Epstein (1985)
noted, "behavior motivated by the experiential system is
experienced as natural, intuitively correct..." (p. 295).
Private Self-Consciousness
The construct of private self
-consciousness
(Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975) also appears similar to
the proposed reasoned/intuitive action tendency. This
construct was described as relating to "a cognitive, private
mulling over the self..." (p. 525). The authors also
hypothesized that self-consciousness may moderate the
relationship between self-report and behavior.
Specifically, "self-conscious persons closely examine their
beliefs and feelings, and so their reported dispositions may
have greater predictive validity than the reports of non-
self-conscious persons" (p. 526)
.
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one difference is apparent between private self-
consciousness and the proposed reasoned/ intuitive action
tendency. Private self
-consciousness includes both a
cognitive and an affective component. The scale for
measuring it contains items primarily concerning feelings
and, to a lesser extent, cognitive problem-solving
processes. This obscures the distinction made by Epstein
(1985) between the rational and experiential conceptual
systems. The scale does not discriminate between
individuals using their rational beliefs and those using
their feelings as guides to behavior. That is to say, being
high in private self-consciousness does not allow one to
conclude that the individual tends toward a rational basis
or an intuitive, experiential basis. (Given the emphasis on
feelings in the scale however, higher self
-consciousness may
be related to the intuitive action tendency.) In contrast,
the proposed action tendency construct is intended to make
just such a distinction.
Ref1ect iVitv-Impul sivity
Other work related to this reasoned action tendency
addressed reflectivity-impulsivity in certain types of
problem-solving situations (see Messer, 1976 for a review).
Typically problems are presented that have several possible
answers. Impulsives are characterized by faster response
times and usually by higher error rates. In contrast,
reflectives exhibit slower response times and lower error
10
rates. This occurs presumably because reflectives are
considering the alternatives and evaluating the available
information more carefully than are impulsives. Subjects in
this research are usually children and the typical measuring
instrument is the Matching Familiar Figures Test, where a
picture is presented and subjects have to choose the match
from several nearly identical pictures. This suggests
several items that could be adapted for a scale to measure
the reasoned/intuitive action tendency in adults. These
items could refer, for example, to the propensity to
carefully consider alternatives before responding or to go
with a "gut feeling."
Delav of Gratification
Work by Mischel and colleagues on delay of
gratification (e.g. Mischel & Patterson, 1976) suggested
that ability to delay gratification can be enhanced through
cognitive strategies such as focusing on the rewarding
consequences of continuing to work. Thus the impulsive
action of immediate gratification is countered by engaging
in a more reasoned analysis of the action's consequences.
This is typically tested by giving children the option of
working at a task until they decide they want to stop and
receive an attractive prize, or working at the task for an
experimenter-specified time period in order to receive an
even more attractive prize. Differences in amount of delay
have been found with different cognitive strategies. Again,
11
scale items can be adapted from this reasoning for use with
adults, for example, "I often go do things that I want to do
instead of studying."
Mvers-Briaas Type IndicatnT-
one other relevant line of research is based on Jung's
theory of psychological types and uses the Myers-Briggs Type
Indicator (MBTI) to study normal (rather than pathological)
individuals (see McCaulley, 1981 for a recent review)
. The
MBTI uses four bipolar dimensions: extroversion-
introversion (E-I), sensation-intuition (S-N)
,
thinking-
feeling (T-F)
,
and judging-perceiving (J-P) . Individuals
are usually scored as being at one pole or the other on each
dimension. The categorical scoring allows classification of
an individual into one of the 16 types formed by all
allowable combinations of the bipolar dimensions.
McCaulley (1981) also reviewed the definitions for each
dimension derived from interpretation of Jung's work:
Extraversion: an outward focus, action-oriented, often
impulsive.
Introversion: thoughtful, contemplative, relying on
enduring concepts to make important
decisions.
Two modes of perception.
Sensation: use of senses in perceiving observable
world.
Intuition: use of insight in perceiving
possibilities and relationships.
Two modes of judgment.
Thinking: linking ideas through concepts and
logical connections.
Feeling: arranging consciousness according to
value.
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Identification of primary and auxiliary modes from s, N, T,
Judging: behavioral indicators for preference ofjudging.
Perceiving: behavioral indicators for preference ofperceiving.
The theory behind the MBTI is quite complex. This brief
discussion is intended to provide an overview of the MBTI
and not an extensive introduction to the theory and the
instrument
.
What should be noted is that some aspects of the MBTI
appear related to the reasoned/ intuitive action tendency.
The contemplative, introverted pole (I) may be similar to a
tendency towards reasoned action. However, the logical,
thinking pole (T) may also be similar. The action-oriented,
extroverted pole (E) and the insightful, intuition pole (N)
may relate to a tendency toward intuitive action.
However, there is at least one problem in comparing the
MBTI to the proposed action tendency. How is one to decide
which of the 16 types are similar to the reasoned/ intuitive
action tendency? Would it be just those individuals with
types completely corresponding (e.g. ISTJ) , those types with
three dimensions corresponding (e.g I_TJ, IS_J, etc.), two
(e.g. I J, IS
,
etc.), or just one (e.g. J, I
,
etc.)? The problem is that there is no clear distinction
found in the MBTI that corresponds directly to the proposed
reasoned action tendency. Consequently, it is not likely
that this instrument would provide much information
regarding the proposed action tendency.
13
Self-Monitori ng
As mentioned earlier, several authors working more
directly in attitude-behavior research have put forth
individual difference variables thought to influence
attitude-behavior correspondence, for example, self-
monitoring (e.g. Snyder, 1979), High self-monitors are
guided more by situational cues than by their own feelings
and attitudes. Low self-monitors are just the opposite.
They base their behavior less on the situation and more on
their internal states. As Snyder (1982) noted, "high self-
monitoring individuals are aware that what they say and do
may not necessarily reflect what they think and feel... low
self-monitoring individuals report that their behavior is
under the guidance of relevant dispositions, attitudes, and
other internal states" (p. 107) . This definition of self-
monitoring shows that it does overlap to some extent with
the proposed reasoned/intuitive action tendency, primarily
in that low-self monitors are guided by their attitudes, as
would those who tend toward reasoned action.
However, it is also clear that self
-monitoring and
reasoned/intuitive action differ in some important ways.
The action tendency proposes individual differences in
styles of thought. Self-monitoring appears not to
distinguish styles of thought. As Snyder (1982) has pointed
out, both types of self-monitors are presumed to think about
their attitudes and feelings, but highs report not using
these as guides for their behavior. In fact, Ajzen, Timko,
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and White (1982) provided data showing equal awareness of
the attitude's implications for behavior for both high and
low self-monitors. There is a lower intention-behavior
correspondence for highs because of the greater impact of
situational forces affecting the previous intention.
Second, in line with Epstein (1985), the reasoned
action tendency refers to differences between behavior
guided by the conscious, reasoned attitudes of the rational
system and behavior guided by the more affective, intuitive
experiential system. Self
-monitoring includes both thoughts
and feelings in its definition, and proposes that
individuals differ in the extent to which they use both as
guides for behavior. This again obscures an important
distinction postulated in the reasoned/ intuitive action
tendency, and noted above with respect to private self-
consciousness. Here, individuals are presumed to differ in
the degree to which they use their rational thoughts or
their experiential feelings as a guide.
Need for Cognition
A second related construct comes from the area of
persuasion and attitude change. Petty and Cacioppo (1986)
proposed a theory of attitude change, the elaboration
likelihood model (ELM) , which distinguishes between two
"routes" leading to persuasion. The first is the central
route, based on "a person's careful and thoughtful
consideration of the true merits of the information
15
presented..." (p. 3). The second route is peripheral, "a
result of some simple cue in the persuasion context (e.g.
attractive source) that induced change without necessitating
scrutiny of the central merits of the issue-relevant
information" (p. 3). This distinction is similar to the
proposed action tendency, although the authors noted that
their model is primarily concerned with persuasion and
attitude change.
A second important aspect of this line of research is
work on a particular individual difference variable, the
need for cognition, found to affect persuasion. This
variable is predicated on the idea that there are
"systematic individual differences among people in their
desire to engage in issue-relevant thinking when dealing
with their social environment generally and when formulating
their attitudes specifically" (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986,
p. 47). This work represents an extension of work by Cohen
and others (cited in Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) on "the
statistical tendency of and intrinsic enjoyment individuals
derive from effortful cognitive activities" (p. 48) . The
authors have developed an 18-item Need for Cognition (NC)
scale to measure this tendency.
At first glance, it appears that need for cognition and
the reasoned action tendency are quite similar. Those high
in need for cognition would correspond to those tending
toward reasoned action. Both constructs imply analytical
activity. However, the strategy followed by Petty and
16
Cacioppo in developing NC items points out one difference.
Items were included to differentiate those liking analytic
activity and those not liking it. items about "inner
broodings" were specifically excluded. Thus being high in
need for cognition may be associated with a tendency toward
reasoned action, but being low in need for cognition does
not appear to be conceptually similar to a tendency toward
intuitive action.
Action Control
Kuhl's work on action control (e.g. 1985) also relates
somewhat to the proposed action tendency. This work
proposed two orientations for an individual's cognitive
processes. One was a state orientation, where the
cognitions relate to past, present, or future states of the
individual. The other was an action orientation, where the
cognitions focus on actions that can alter the current state
to a desired future state. A state orientation is presumed
to hinder an individual's intention to act. Kuhl (1985)
also discussed the Action Control scale developed to assess
individual differences in action versus state orientation.
There appears to be some overlap of action orientation
with a tendency toward reasoned action. Better prediction
of behavior is expected for individuals who are classified
as either of these types. However, as noted earlier with
respect to the need for cognition work, there seems to be a
conceptual difference in the opposite pole. For Kuhl
17
(1985), state orientation hinders intention to act. Thus
prediction of behavior from intention is not expected to be
high for these individuals. m contrast, the underlying
assumption of the reasoned/ intuitive action tendency is that
behavioral predictability using a belief-based model such as
the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985) is somewhat
poorer for those people who tend to behave intuitively, it
is not assumed that an intuitive tendency will necessarily
inhibit behavioral prediction. Rather, it may require a new
method of assessing the behavioral determinants of intuitive
individuals, but with appropriate measures good behavioral
predictability should be obtained.
Hvpotheses
The current study had two goals. The first was
developing a scale to measure the reasoned/ intuitive action
tendency and establishing its reliability and validity. The
second was to use the scale to determine whether the
relationships among the constructs of the theory of planned
behavior would be stronger for those individuals tending
toward reasoned action than for those tending toward
intuitive action.
The context for the second part of the study was the
1988 United States Presidential election. Two behaviors
were of interest: election participation and actual
candidate choice. It was hypothesized that the
relationships shown earlier in Figure 1 would be stronger
18
for those individuals tending toward reasoned action than
for those tending toward intuitive action. For example,
with respect to both election participation and candidate
choice, the belief-based measures of attitude, subjective
norm, and perceived behavioral control should better predict
the direct measures of these constructs for those with a
reasoned action tendency. Similarly, the direct measures of
these constructs should better predict both participation
intention and candidate choice intention for individuals
tending toward reasoned action. Finally, these two
intentions should better predict actual behavior for those
tending toward reasoned action than for those tending toward
intuitive action.
In addition, perceived behavioral control was
hypothesized to differ in predictability for these two
behaviors. Participating in the election is an act only
partially under an individual's control. Availability of
time and transportation, weather conditions, and many other
factors not under an individual's control may prevent one
from voting. If one is at the polling place, however,
actually choosing a candidate is presumed to be almost
completely, if not completely, under volitional control.
Thus perceived behavioral control is expected to add to the
predictability of election participation, but is not
expected to add to the predictability of actual candidate
choice.
19
CHAPTER 2
STUDY l: REASONED/INTUITIVE ACTION SCALE DEVELOPMENT
Method
Subjects
subjects were 119 (31 male, 88 female) volunteers from
Spring 1988 University of Massachusetts at Amherst
psychology classes. Subjects from all class levels were
recruited to participate in a two-part questionnaire study
of "preferences and opinions regarding everyday life
events." All subjects received class credit for their
participation following completion of both parts of this
study
.
Materials
Seven questionnaires were used in Study 1 (see Appendix
A)
.
These included a set of 100 items potentially measuring
the reasoned/ intuitive action tendency, the Marlowe-Crowne
(1966) Social Desirability Scale, Kuhl's (1985) Action
Control Scale, a slightly modified Need for Cognition Scale
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) , the Private Self-Consciousness
Scale (Fenigstein, Scheier & Buss, 1975) , the Self-
Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1979) , and a free-response
questionnaire assessing the belief-based constructs of the
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theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985) with respect to the
Fall 1988 U.S. Presidential election.
The original need for cognition 5-point response scale
had endpoints of "extremely characteristic" and "extremely
uncharacteristic." The response scale used in this study
had five points labeled "not at all-," "slightly-,"
"moderately-," "very-," and "extremely characteristic" of
the subject.
The 100 items in the reasoned/intuitive action set were
developed to represent various aspects of the reasoned/
intuitive action domain. These aspects included such things
as relying on one's intuitive feelings when deciding on a
course of action, using intuitive feelings in interpersonal
situations, logically analyzing situations for solutions,
and being organized. Item content was based on the
perception of the author and a colleague as to what would
distinguish people who use a more reasoned approach to
behavior from people who use a more intuitive approach. The
items covered a broad range of behaviors and life situations
that might differentiate between these two approaches. Some
examples of items from the intuitive pole are "I usually
trust my instincts when deciding on a new course of action"
and "I know when something is right or wrong even if I
sometimes cannot justify my feeling." The logical pole had
such items as "For important decisions, I tend to do the
logical thing, no matter how I feel about the situation" and
"I try to make sure my judgments are not influenced by my
21
emotions." The remainder of these loo items appear in the
first questionnaire of Appendix A.
The free-response questionnaire for assessment of the
constructs of the theory of planned behavior required three
target behaviors: voting in the election, voting for the
Democratic presidential candidate, and voting for the
Republican presidential candidate (the latter two behaviors
were both required for prediction of actual voting choice)
.
Attitudinal beliefs were elicited through subjects listing
the advantages, disadvantages, and any other thoughts
relating to each target behavior. Normative beliefs were
elicited through subjects listing all important people or
groups who would approve or disapprove of each target
behavior. Control beliefs were elicited through subjects
listing all factors that would facilitate or hinder
performance of each target behavior (see Ajzen & Fishbein,
1980 for details regarding belief assessment)
.
It should be noted that this study was conducted during
the primary campaign season, prior to the selection of
Michael Dukakis as the Democratic candidate. At the time of
study, Jesse Jackson appeared to be a strong contender for
the candidacy. Thus the free-response questionnaire
contained questions regarding voting in the election in
general, voting for George Bush, voting for Michael Dukakis,
and voting for Jesse Jackson. The final questionnaire in
Appendix A contains the belief-elicitation items regarding
voting in the election and voting for Michael Dukakis.
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Identical questions were asked with respect to George Bush
and Jesse Jackson.
Procedure
In Part 1, participants were told that the study was in
two parts, "in order to prevent the fatigue that might arise
if all questions to be included in the study were completed
in one session." Four questionnaires were used, the 100
reasoned/intuitive action items, the Social Desirability
Scale, the Action Control Scale, and the Need for Cognition
Scale. The order of questionnaires in each packet was
randomly determined. The subjects were told that there were
no right or wrong answers, only preferences and opinions.
Approximately 10 to 14 days later, 117 students (30
male, 87 female) returned to participate in Part 2.
Participants completed the 100 reasoned/ intuitive action
items for a second time, the Private Self-Consciousness
Scale, the Self-Monitoring Scale, and the free-response
belief-elicitation measure regarding the election. The
order of the first three scales was counterbalanced; the
belief-elicitation measure was always the final part of the
questionnaire. Participation in both Part 1 and Part 2 was
in groups ranging in size from 9 to 25 students.
To reduce suspicion regarding the repetition of the
reasoned/ intuitive items in Part 2 of the study subjects
were told that "some of the questionnaires from Part 1 were
missing some pages, and that in order to get complete data.
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some questions were being repeated." if subjects had
already seen particular questions they were asked to
complete them again. if they had not seen the questions,
then it would be their first time. The items repeated were
not specifically identified, m fact, all questionnaires
from Part 1 were complete and the "missing pages" story was
fictitious.
Following completion of Part 2, subjects received both
written and oral feedback regarding the purpose of the
study, including an explanation of the need for the cover
story of "missing pages," and thanked for their
participation in the study.
Results and Discussion
Part 1
A principal components factor analysis of the 100
reasoned/ intuitive action items was performed in an attempt
to find a unidimensional set of items. However, the rotated
factor loadings showed 32 factors with eigenvalues greater
than one. Thus a different approach was taken for
development of the Reasoned/ Intuitive Action Scale.
A two-stage analysis was performed on the initial 100
items, in order to derive a reliable scale with fewer items.
The first step was an alpha reliability analysis. All items
having a .20 or greater item-total correlation were summed
to create a scale score. The second step correlated all 100
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items with this scale score. Any new items now correlating
.20 or greater were added to the scale and the alpha
reliability analysis was repeated.
This reliability/correlation process was repeated until
all items in the scale's reliability analysis were .20 or
greater, and no remaining items correlated
.20 or greater
with the scale. This resulted in a set of 35 items. The
cut-off was set at .20 because this exceeded the correlation
coefficient of .15 required for significance at £ < .05 two-
tailed and N = 195.
These 35 items appeared generally representative of the
reasoned pole of the reasoned/ intuitive action construct, so
the remaining items were analyzed in the same manner, to
determine if they also contained a reliable set. After
successive reliability and correlational analyses, 40 items
remained in this set. These items appeared generally
representative of the intuitive pole of the construct.
Part 2
Responses to the 100 reasoned/ intuitive action items in
the second administration were again subjected to a
principal components factor analysis. Thirty factors with
eigenvalues greater than one were extracted, providing no
clear results. Thus the iterative reliability/correlation
approach described in Part 1 was again employed on all 100
items. A set of 29 items resulted, which seemed to describe
reasoned action. The remaining 71 items were analyzed
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similarly and produced a 39-item set describing, in general,
intuitive action. it is important to note that the items in
the sets at this stage were not identical to the item sets
from Part 1. This rendered analysis of the relationship
between the sets meaningless until the final sets of items
were determined, as described below.
With Michael Dukakis receiving the Democratic
nomination for President, it was not necessary to analyze
responses to the questions regarding voting for Jesse
Jackson. The three target behaviors for the election study
(Study 2, see Chapter 3) were thus finalized as voting in
the election, voting for George Bush, and voting for Michael
Dukakis.
The belief-elicitation questions for behavioral,
normative, and control beliefs with respect to each target
behavior were content analyzed to determine the set of modal
salient beliefs regarding the behaviors (see Ajzen &
Fishbein, 1980, pp. 68-70 for determination of modal salient
beliefs)
.
The first step was to group similar responses
together. Subjects often reported similar beliefs but used
slightly different wording. Variations in wording were
taken to be representative of different beliefs only if a
large number of subjects reported two (or more) of the
variations in their own set of beliefs. The final wording
for each salient belief was that which was used by the most
subjects. In cases where no particular wording had a clear
majority, the author constructed a belief that best
described the variations given by the subjects. For each
behavior, approximately lo responses with the greatest
frequency were retained for use in Study 2. Examples of
these beliefs are given in Chapter 3, in the description of
the materials used in Study 2.
Final Reasoned and Intuitive Action Scalf^g
The two sets of reasoned action items resulting from
the reliability and correlation analyses of the Part 1 and
Part 2 data were compared for consistency. Overall, the two
sets showed considerable consistency. items were retained
for the final item set if the item-total correlation
exceeded .15 on both the Part 1 and the Part 2 analyses.
This resulted in 29 reasoned action items.
The two sets of intuitive items were also examined for
consistency from Part 1 to Part 2. These items also showed
high consistency. Items were retained for the final item
set if the item-total correlation exceeded .15 on both the
Part 1 and the Part 2 analyses. The result was a set of 37
intuitive action items.
Although two empirically coherent sets of items were
derived from the reliability/correlational analysis
described above, it appeared that the items in the reasoned
set were actually tapping more than just reasoned action.
Some of the items also appeared relevant to intuitive
action, as well as other action domains such as decisiveness
and effectiveness. A similar problem existed with the
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intuitive set of items. This low face validity in each set
of items prompted further analysis, in an attempt to
increase the consistency among the items in each set. Of
course, a high degree of empirical consistency was also to
be maintained in these analyses.
The first step was to combine all 66 items into one
pool and perform a principal components factor analysis on
the entire pool, first with data from Part l, and then with
data from Part 2. A rotated three-factor solution,
accounting for approximately 24% of the total variance,
clearly emerged from both the Part 1 and Part 2 analyses.
The items loading on each factor were also quite consistent
across both parts.
The first factor, labeled ineffectiveness, accounted
for approximately 10% of the variance in both Part 1 and
Part 2. After discarding items with factor loadings less
than .30, 13 items remained. Examples of the items were "I
have sometimes missed out on opportunities because I
couldn't make up my mind" and "When necessary, I can be very
assertive." The latter item loaded negatively on the
factor; all such items were reverse scored so that a high
total score on this scale would indicate ineffective action.
This 13-item scale had alpha reliabilities of .75 in Part 1
and .73 in Part 2.
The second factor, named reasoned action, accounted for
approximately eight percent of the variance in both Parts 1
and 2. After discarding items with factor loadings less
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than
.30 in both analyses, 14 items remained. These
included "I try to weigh all the pros and cons before making
a decision" and "I usually have clear, explainable reasons
for my decisions." items with negative loadings were
reverse scored to make high total scores indicative of high
reasoned action. This 14-item scale had alpha reliabilities
of .73 and .79 in Parts 1 and 2, respectively.
The third factor, labeled intuitive action, accounted
for approximately six percent of the variance in both Part 1
and Part 2. Again keeping only items with factor loadings
greater than .3 0, a set of 12 intuitive action items
resulted. Examples were "When it comes to trusting other
people, I can usually rely on my 'gut feelings'" and "I
usually trust my instincts when deciding on a new course of
action." All the items loaded positively on this factor, so
high total scores represented high intuitive action. The
alpha reliabilities for this 13-item scale were .72 in Part
1 and .79 in Part 2.
Appendix B contains the final item sets for all three
scales. Since the Reasoned Action and Intuitive Action
Scales are most relevant to this investigation, results will
be presented only for these two scales.
Test-Retest and Validity Analvses
In developing the new scales, it was also important to
obtain a measure of their test-retest reliabilities, their
inter-correlations, and their convergent and discriminant
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validities (Campbell & Fiske iqc;q\ ^ ^^ ^LSK , 1959) with respect to other
constructs. These results for the final versions of both
scales appear in Table l. The significance level was set to
.01, two-tailed, in order to provide some protection against
artifactual results arising from multiple, non-independent
significance tests on the same data.
As can be seen from the table, the test-retest
reliabilities for both the Reasoned and Intuitive Action
Scales were generally high. For the Intuitive Action Scale
this reliability was .72; for the Reasoned Action Scale it
Table 1
Reliability and Validity Analyses for Intuitive and Reasoned
Action Scales
Scade
Scale RA1IA2RA2 SD AC NCSM PS
lAl .06
(119)
.72*
(117)
.06
(117)
-.03
(117)
-.02
(118)
-.01
(119)
-.06
(117)
.39*
(117)
.08
(117)
.86*
(117)
.43*
(117)
.33*
(118)
.50*
(119)
-.09
(117)
.21
(117)
IA2 .09
(117)
-.08
(115)
.00
(116)
.05
(117)
.08
(117)
.46*
(117)
RA2 .36*
(115)
.31*
(116)
.47*
(117)
-.04
(117)
.14
(117)
Note . lAl and IA2 - Intuitive action for Parts 1 and 2 respectively,
RAl and RA2 - Reasoned action for Parts 1 and 2 re^KCtively, SD - Social
desirability, AC - Actiai oontrol, NC - Need for oogniticn, SM - Self-
monitoring, and PS - Private self-ocnsciousness.
^Missing data deleted pairwise, thus the difference in IJ.
*p < .01, twD-tai"!
.
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was
.86, both significant at g < .01. Furthermore,
inspection of the relationship between the two scales showed
negligible correlations in both Part 1 and Part 2 (r < .10,
not significant, in both parts)
. This supported the idea
that the two scales were measuring different aspects of the
reasoned/ intuitive action tendency, and not simply opposite
ends of a single dimension.
Turning to the validity coefficients, one can see in
Table 1 that the Intuitive Action Scale correlated
significantly with only private self
-consciousness. This
finding was consistent, r = .39 in Part 1 and r = .46 (ps <
.01) in Part 2. This indicated some degree of convergent
validity, since private self-consciousness contained items
primarily dealing with awareness of one's feelings, and the
Intuitive Action Scale was aimed at use of 'gut-feelings' or
intuition as the basis for action. Discriminant validity
was shown by the non-significant relationships with the
remaining scales, all of which measured constructs unrelated
to intuitive action.
In contrast, the Reasoned Action Scale showed
moderately positive correlations with social desirability,
action control, and need for cognition. The Reasoned Action
Scale appeared most similar to need for cognition, r = .50
and r = .47 (ps < .01) in Parts 1 and 2, respectively. The
overlap with action control was less, r = .33 and r = .31
(ES < .01), indicating moderate similarity between the two
measures. Thus some degree of convergent validity was
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:ion
evidenced again, since both need for cognition and act
control are related to reasoned action. Discriminant
validity was shown by the non-significant correlations with
self-monitoring and private self
-consciousness. The weak
positive relationship with private self-consciousness, (rs =
.21 and .14, not significant), did follow from the fact that
the Private Self-consciousness Scale included two items more
indicative of a reasoned action tendency, (e.g. I'm aware of
the way my mind works when I work through a problem)
.
The relationship to social desirability was of some
concern. Although moderate in nature, rs = .43 and .36 (ps
< .01), it may indicate that the Reasoned Action Scale was
not picking up solely an action tendency. Responses that
are based, even to a moderate extent, on what is perceived
as desirable, as opposed to a "true" action tendency, may
decrease the likelihood of finding a moderating effect based
on this measure in the attitude-behavior relationship.
In fact, the relationship of reasoned action to social
desirability was apparent from the outset of this project.
It was difficult to create items deemed reflective of the
reasoned action tendency that appeared capable of rejection
by subjects. Many items considered during initial
construction were discarded because it appeared that no one
would admit to behaving in ways that implied non-reasoned
action. Items that were retained did not appear to be as
subject to this effect.
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TO summarize the results of Study 1, the anticipated
bipolar, unidimensional scale to measure the reasoned/
intuitive action tendency was not found from the procedures
in this study. Rather, two independent scales, one for
reasoned action and one for intuitive action, were
developed. The Intuitive Action Scale had good test-retest
reliability, internal consistency, and discriminant
validity, moderate convergent validity, and a low
correlation with social desirability. The Reasoned Action
Scale had somewhat higher test-retest reliability, the same
internal consistency, good convergent validity, moderate
discriminant validity, but a high correlation with social
desirability. Overall, the Intuitive Action Scale may be
the better scale with which to demonstrate the hypothesized
moderating effects of action tendency. Both scales were
included, however, in Study 2.
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CHAPTER 3
STODY 2
:
TESTING THE MODERATING EFFECTS OF REASONED/
INTUITIVE ACTION ON THE ATTITUDE-BEHAVIOR RELATIONSHIP
Method
Subjects
Subjects were 195 volunteers (53 male and 142 female)
from Fall 1988 University of Massachusetts at Amherst
psychology classes. Participants were recruited from
classes of all levels for a questionnaire study of
"students' attitudes and opinions regarding the 1988 U.S.
Presidential election." Only students registered to vote in
the election were eligible to participate. All subjects
received class credit for their participation following
completion of the questionnaire.
Materials
The questionnaire contained the 66 action tendency
items, in random order, from the pool generated in the
reliability and correlation analyses of Study 1 (including
all 66 items permitted repetition of the principal
components factor analysis from Study 1) , and the items
assessing the constructs of the theory of planned behavior
(TPB)
. These questionnaires appear in Appendix C. The
order of the action tendency and the TPB sections was
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counterbalanced, as was the order of appearance of questions
about George Bush and Michael Dukakis within the TPB
section.
The informed consent form at the beginning of the
questionnaire noted that some students might be called
approximately one week following the election and asked a
few brief follow-up questions, in addition, a separate
sheet was inserted after the consent form. This sheet asked
subjects to "Please describe your 'gut feelings' or
emotional reactions when you see Michael Dukakis. In other
words, disregarding his position on the issues, how does he
come across to you. Please list in short phrases your first
reactions." The identical question was also asked with
respect to George Bush. Subjects had one half of a sheet of
paper in which to respond to each candidate. The order of
appearance for Dukakis and Bush was counterbalanced across
subjects. Subjects were asked to complete this assessment
of their reaction to each candidate prior to answering the
remainder of the questions, in order to obtain as "pure" an
intuitive reaction as possible. This measure was designed
to reflect the experiential system in Epstein's cognitive-
experiential self-theory (personal communication, 1988)
.
The majority of the questionnaire items were intended
to assess the constructs of the theory of planned behavior.
These items used a semantic differential format and the
instructions immediately preceding the TPB section contained
examples describing this format.
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The TPB section contained the belief items derived from
Study 1 for the target behaviors of voting in the election,
voting for Michael Dukakis, and voting for George Bush. A
few belief items were also added to capture late
developments in the presidential campaign, such as the
controversy over Bush's selection of Dan Quayle as his
running mate.
This TPB section also contained items for direct
assessment of subjects' intentions, attitudes, subjective
norms, and perceived behavioral control with respect to each
of the three target behaviors. This section was pre-tested
on 11 subjects early in the Fall of 1988. Ambiguous items
were clarified or removed to obtain the final version of the
TPB questionnaire.
The first subsection of the TPB questionnaire concerned
voting in the election. This subsection always appeared
first for all subjects. The belief-based items and the
direct assessment items were interspersed throughout this
section.
Intention to vote in the election was measured directly
with two items appearing in separate parts of the
subsection. "I intend to vote in the 1988 presidential
election" was rated on a 7-point scale, ranging from
"likely" to "unlikely." "I will try to vote in the 1988
presidential election" was rated on a 7-point scale using
"definitely yes" and "definitely no" as endpoints. Summing
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these two items together formed the direct measure of
subjects' intention.
Ten outcomes regarding voting in the election were
evaluated on 7-point scales, with endpoints labeled
"extremely good" and "extremely bad." These items included
"By voting in the 1988 presidential election I will take
part in a democracy" and "if i vote in the 1988 presidential
election I might later come to regret the choice I made."
At a different point in the subsection, belief strength for
each of these 10 outcomes was obtained by rating the item on
a 7-point scale with endpoints labeled "extremely likely"
and "extremely unlikely." Each outcome evaluation was
multiplied by its corresponding belief strength, and the sum
over all 10 items comprised the belief-based measure of
attitude toward voting in the election.
A direct measure of attitude toward voting in the
election was obtained from subjects rating the concept "My
voting in the 1988 presidential election" on five bipolar
adjective scales from the evaluative factor of Osgood, Suci,
and Tannenbaum's (1957) semantic differential work. The
scales were "harmful-beneficial," "happy-sad," "wise-
foolish," "unpleasant-pleasant," and "good-bad." Summing
over these five scales produced the direct attitude measure.
Belief-based subjective norms were assessed with
respect to 10 referents. These referents were Dukakis
supporters, parents, other family members. Bush, Dukakis,
friends. Bush supporters, the Democrats, society in general.
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and the Republicans. Normative beliefs regarding each
referent were obtained on 7-point scales with endpoints
marked "very much" and "not at all." The format was "My
friends would approve of my voting in the 1988 presidential
election, regardless of who I vote for." Later, motivation
to comply with each referent was assessed by a 7-point scale
with endpoints labeled "extremely likely" and "extremely
unlikely." Each item was multiplied by its corresponding
belief strength and the sum over all lo referents formed the
belief-based normative measure.
A direct measure of subjective norm came from responses
to two other items spaced throughout this subsection. One
item, "Most people who are important to me think I
should/should not vote in the 1988 presidential election,"
was rated on a 7-point scale with endpoints "should" and
"should not." The second item was "Most people who are
important to me would approve of my voting in the 1988
presidential election," rated on a 7-point scale anchored by
"not at all" and "very much."
A general motivation-to-comply item was also included,
on a trial basis. It read, "Generally speaking, I want to
do what most people who are important to me think I should
do," and used a 7-point "not at all" to "very much" response
scale. Multiplying this with each item regarding general
normative beliefs above, and taking the sum of both
products, produced an alternative direct assessment of
subjective norm. This measure was not used in the final
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analyses, primarily because of its experimental nature, but
also because preliminary results for this alternative
measure showed lower correlations with the other constructs
in the theory than did the standard measure of subjective
norm described above.
Belief-based and general measures of perceived
behavioral control were also obtained, six factors that
could facilitate or hinder voting in the election were rated
on the extent to which each would make it difficult for
subjects to vote in the election. For example, "To what
extent would lack of transportation make it difficult for
you personally to vote in the 1988 presidential election?"
was rated on a 7-point scale with endpoints "not at all
difficult" and "extremely difficult." Each factor was also
rated for likelihood of occurrence using a 7-point scale
labeled "likely" and "unlikely." Multiplying each
difficulty rating by the appropriate likelihood estimate and
taking the sum across all six factors gave the belief-based
measure of control.
A direct measure of perceived control over voting in
the election was assessed by two questions, "How much
control do you have over voting in the 1988 presidential
election?" and "How easy or difficult would it be for you to
vote in the 1988 presidential election?" Both were rated on
7-point scales, the former with endpoints of "no control"
and "complete control" and the latter using "easy" and
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"difficult." The sum of these two items constituted the
direct measure of perceived control.
The next section of the TPB dealt with voting for the
two candidates. One subsection contained 21 outcomes
associated with voting for either Michael Dukakis or George
Bush. Thirteen of these items were relevant to voting for
both candidates; four were specific to Dukakis and four were
specific to Bush. Each item was evaluated on a 7-point
scale with endpoints "good" and "bad." Some of the items
were "Having a president concerned about minority issues
is" (relevant to both candidates)
,
"Having a president from
Massachusetts is" (Dukakis-specific)
, and "Having an
inexperienced or inadequate vice-president is" (Bush-
specific)
.
The next two subsections dealt specifically with voting
for one candidate or the other. As mentioned above, these
sections were counterbalanced across subjects. Both belief-
based and direct measures of the constructs of the TPB were
mixed throughout these subsections. Assessment was similar
to that described above, except that belief-based measures
of perceived control were omitted because Study 1 revealed
that subjects saw very few factors that could facilitate or
hinder their choice of a particular candidate. The major
difference from the first subsection was that the target
behavior now referred specifically to voting for a
particular candidate.
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The following description refers to voting for Michael
Dukakis. The same format was also used for George Bush.
The likelihood portion of the belief-based attitude measure
was obtained from ratings of the likelihood of occurrence of
17 outcomes associated with voting for Michael Dukakis (4
unique and 13 also relevant to Bush) on 7-point scales
labeled "likely" and "unlikely." Each likelihood estimate
was multiplied by the corresponding outcome evaluation from
the previous subsection. Summing across all 17 items
produced the belief-based attitude measure. Examples of
these items appear above in the subsection description of
the 21 outcomes associated with voting for a specific
candidate.
Attitude was assessed directly via responses to the
five semantic differential scales mentioned above. The sum
of these five scales was then used as a direct measure
attitude toward voting for Dukakis,
The motivation-to-comply component of the normative
belief measure was found from responses to eight referent
groups important to voting for Michael Dukakis. These were
Dukakis supporters, the Democrats, society in general,
Michael Dukakis, friends, parents, other family members, and
the Republicans. Each was rated on a 7-point scale from
"not at all" to "very much."
The direct measure of subjective norm was found from
the two questions as above, substituting voting for Dukakis
in place of voting in the election.
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A direct measure of perceived behavioral control and
intention to vote for Dukakis used the same two questions
for each construct, as above, again substituting voting for
Dukakis in place of voting in the election.
Finally, all subjects completed one page of demographic
questions regarding age, type of hometown, prior voting
history, political ideology, and political party
affiliation. This page always came at the end of the
questionnaire
.
Procedure
Subjects completed the questionnaires in groups ranging
from 18 to 48 students, with three additional subjects
completing the questionnaire individually. Approximately
two to four weeks following the election, attempts were made
to call all subjects, and 181 (93%) were reached (45 male,
13 6 female)
.
After assuring anonymity of their responses,
subjects were asked if they had voted in the election. If
they had, they were asked to reveal which presidential
candidate they chose and any important factors that
influenced their choice. If they had not voted in the
election, they were asked their reasons for not voting.
At the conclusion of the telephone call all subjects
received a verbal debriefing regarding the purpose of the
study and a summary of the results obtained to date.
Subjects not reached by telephone were sent a letter of
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debriefing when classes resumed for the Spring 1989
semester.
Results and Discu5=;«:;i on
Subject Demographics and Voting R^hav-ir^Y
Subjects ranged in age from 18 to 47 years (M = 20.2,
SD = 4.2). When asked to categorize their hometown, the
following distribution resulted: 10.8% large city, 45.1%
suburb of large city, 39.0% small town, and 5.1% rural area.
Of the 195 subjects, 153 were registered in Massachusetts,
42 were registered out of state.
Subjects were asked if they had previously voted in one
or more of the following types of elections: student,
local, state, or national. 67.2% had voted in at least one
of the four. Specifically, 67.2% had voted in student
elections, 25.6% in local elections, 19.5% in state
elections, and 11.8% in national elections.
Subjects rated their political orientation on a 7-point
scale from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. The
results were 5.6% extremely liberal, 26.2% quite liberal,
24.6% slightly liberal, 22.1% neither, 15.4% slightly
conservative, 5.1% quite conservative, and 1.0% were
extremely conservative.
In terms of party identification, 16.9% were Democrat,
31.3% were Independent but leaning Democrat, 28.2% were
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independent, 15.4% were Independent but leaning Republican,
and 8.2% were Republican.
As mentioned, attempts were made to call all subjects
two to four weeks following the election. One hundred
eighty one of the 195 participants were reached and
questioned regarding their voting behavior. Of the 181,
76.8% voted in the election and 23.2% did not. Of the 139
who participated in the election, 67.6% chose Michael
Dukakis, 30.2% chose George Bush, and 2.2% either chose
another candidate, or did not vote for a presidential
candidate.
According to the theory of planned behavior, external
variables such as political orientation or party
identification will only influence behavior if they affect
one or more of the constructs of the theory. For example,
political orientation could have an influence at the belief
level, at the direct construct level, or at the intention
level. However, such a variable is not expected to directly
affect behavior. Consequently, these external variables
were not of interest in this study, and they were not
analyzed further.
Intuitive Reactions to the Candidates
Subjects' open-ended responses regarding their 'gut-
feelings' towards each candidate were coded by the author
and a colleague into three categories, positive feeling,
negative feeling, and neutral or no feeling. This system
44
was chosen over that reported by Miller, Wattenberg, and
Malanchuk (1986) in their analysis of open-ended questions
in the American National Election Studies from 1952 to 1984,
because the former produced much higher rater agreement
(94.2%) than that obtained after practice with the Miller et
al. system (approximately 65% agreement).
A summary measure reflecting subjects' responses to
both candidates was created. Intuitive reaction to Dukakis
was determined as the sum of the positive comments regarding
Dukakis minus the sum of the negative comments. Intuitive
reaction to Bush was determined in the same manner.
Finally, an evaluative candidate preference score was formed
as the reaction to Dukakis minus the reaction to Bush.
Constructs in the Theory of Planned Behavior
Because multiple items were used in the direct
assessment of the constructs of the theory of planned
behavior, it was informative to examine the alpha
reliability coefficients of these measures. Table 2
presents these coefficients for the direct attitude,
subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control scales
separately for each target behavior. Attitude was the sum
of five semantic differential ratings; the other measures
were sums of the two items measuring that particular
construct.
Overall the reliabilities were quite high, with eight
of the coefficients exceeding .80. However, there were some
45
Table 2
Theory of PlannM Rohyrjor n,^^^^
Reliabilities
Scede
Target
'
I l?ATrijasNl*apBCija
Voting in
the election
.89 195 .82 192 .29 195 .32 195
Vcfting for
Michael DukaJcis
.99 195 .95 194 .88 195 .22 195
Voting for
George Bush
.99 195 .96 194 .83 193 .12 193
llbte. I = Intention, ATT = Attitude, SN = Subjective nonn, PBC = Perceived
behaviorzLL COTitrol.
^tissijig data deleted pairwise, thus the difference in N.
exceptions. Subjective norm with respect to voting in the
election was .29. This apparently was due to low variation
and almost universal agreement with these items. In
general, subjects reported that most people important to
them would greatly approve of their voting in the election.
Very few subjects chose any option from the neutral point to
the extreme negative endpoint (M = 6.5 and SD = .90 on the
7-point scale)
. Subjects also responded in a like manner to
the "Most people who are important to me think I should/
should not vote in the election" question (M = 6.2 and SD =
1.3). In contrast, there was more variation in subjects'
ratings on these items when considering voting for each
candidate (average M = 4.04 and SD = 1.76 over both
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candidates)
.
Clearly, voting in general is perceived to be
expected, a duty of all citizens. However, voting for a
given candidate can be expected or not, depending on the
particular referent group.
The reliabilities for perceived behavioral control were
also low. This may be due to different perceptions of
control regarding the two items used. The item regarding
control over participating in the election was probably
influenced by the expectation that some factors can
physically facilitate or hinder voting, (e.g. sickness or
lack of transportation)
. However, the ease or difficulty
associated with participating in the election, and
especially voting for a given candidate, may have been
interpreted as factors mentally facilitating or inhibiting
voting behavior (e.g. agreement with the candidate's
position)
, and not physical impediments.
The analyses reported used both items for the summed
perceived control measure, in order to capture both aspects
of control potentially important in this behavior. Separate
analyses using each control item were also performed. The
question regarding control over election participation and
candidate choice showed little variance and did not
correlate highly with the criterion. The easy-difficult
question showed a pattern of results very similar to those
obtained with the two-item summed control measure. Thus,
the first question appeared to function as a constant, while
the second question was more predictive of the criterion.
47
Moderating Effect of Reason^ri /Tntuitive An-hinn
A principal components factor analysis on the 66 action
tendency items again produced the interpretable three-factor
solution found in Study l. Thus there were potentially
three scales available for examining the moderating effect
of action tendency: ineffectiveness, reasoned action, and
intuitive action. Results will only be presented for the
Reasoned Action and Intuitive Action Scales, because these
were directly relevant to this study. Results regarding
ineffectiveness appear in endnotes.
Reliability analyses were conducted on both the
Reasoned and Intuitive Action Scales. ^ Alpha coefficients
were .76 (N = 193) for the former and .76 (N = 193) for the
latter, indicating a reasonable degree of reliability. The
correlation between the two scales was practically zero (r =
.01, N = 193). This replicated the earlier pattern showing
that reasoned action and intuitive action, as measured by
these scales, were not opposite ends of a single dimension.
The hypothesis under investigation was that the theory
of planned behavior (TPB) should show better predictability
for individuals tending toward more reasoned action than for
individuals tending toward more intuitive action. Since a
unidimensional measure of this construct was not developed
in this study, this hypothesis was tested in two ways, using
subjects' standing on first the Reasoned Action Scale, and
then their standing on the Intuitive Action Scale. Thus the
general hypothesis tested was that high reasoned action
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subjects should be better predicted than low reasoned action
subjects, and conversely, low intuitive action subjects
should be better predicted than high intuitive action
subjects.
Multiple regressions were attempted using the direct
measures of the TPB and interaction scores formed by
multiplying these direct measures with first the Reasoned
Action Scale score, and then with the Intuitive Action Scale
score. In both cases the multiple regression failed because
of multicollinearity among the predictors. Thus a different
approach was used.
Median splits were performed on both scales. The 14-
item Reasoned Action Scale had a median of 47, and the 12-
item Intuitive Action Scale had a median of 43 (possible
range on the former 14 to 70 and 12 to 60 on the latter) .
The resulting groups were not equal in size due to a number
of subjects falling exactly at the median. These subjects
were arbitrarily assigned to the low group on each scale by
making scores in the low group less than or equal to the
median score. The following analyses used pairwise deletion
of data, in order to use as much valid data as possible. In
addition, the significance level was set at .01, 1-tail, in
order to provide some protection against an inflated Type I
error rate resulting from multiple, non-independent tests.
In the theory of planned behavior, salient beliefs are
regarded as the underlying determinants of its constructs.
Thus it was expected that the belief-based and direct
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measures of the constructs would be significantly
correlated. As described in the Methods section above, the
belief-based measures were sums; for example, the behavioral
belief measures were created by multiplying subjects'
behavioral outcome evaluation with the corresponding
likelihood estimate, and then taking the sum over all the
relevant belief items. To simplify presentation of the
results for each candidate, a difference score was created
for each construct in the TPB by subtracting the summed
construct score for Bush from the summed construct score for
Dukakis. No correlation could be computed between control
beliefs and perceived control for the candidate difference
score because no control beliefs were elicited regarding
control over voting for a particular candidate.
Difference scores can be problematic, since they
combine the error variance of two measures. However, the
high correlations between the constructs of the theory, with
respect to both candidates, reduced the possible error
variance that would be combined. Thus, these difference
scores did not seem overly troublesome.
The results for the entire sample are presented in
Table 3. The relationships between the belief-based and
direct measures clearly supported the predictions of the
TPB. All the obtained correlations were significant. As
can be seen, the correlations between the belief-based and
direct constructs for voting in the election were much lower
than those for the difference scores between the two
50
Table 3
Correlations Betwef^n Belief-R;.<.od and nW^nt Measnro...
Total Sample
Toted Sanple^
Measures
Voting in the electicn
BB-ATT 190 .47*
NB-SN 191 .25*
CB-PBC 191 .39*
Dukakis minus Bush
difference scores
BB-ATT 191 ,90*
NB-SN 191 .77*
Note. BB = Behavioral beliefs, ATT = Attitixie, NB = Normative beliefs,
SN = Subjective norm, CB = Oontrol beliefs, PBC = Perceived behavioral
oontx'ol.
^lissing data deleted pairwise, thus the difference in N.
*p < .01
candidates. One possible explanation was that restricting
participation to subjects already registered to vote in the
election reduced the variance on the measures regarding
voting in the election. Registered subjects may already
have a favorable attitude toward voting and taken steps to
ensure their availability to actually vote. Thus low
variance on these measures would produce the lower
correlations observed.
A second possible explanation was that the modal
salient beliefs obtained from Study 1 were not appropriate
for subjects in Study 2. While this is possible, it is
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unlikely that beliefs regarding the candidates would be
appropriate and produce higher correlations, while beliefs
regarding election participation would not be appropriate.
If anything, one might expect the reverse. That is, there
may be more consensus among beliefs regarding election
participation (e.g. it is a duty), than the possibly
idiosyncratic beliefs regarding particular candidates (e.g.
he has a big nose)
.
Table 4 presents the relationships between the belief-
based and direct measures for the high and low reasoned
action groups. The expected pattern of results, high
reasoned greater than low reasoned, was not found. Instead
a mixed pattern occurred, with two high reasoned
correlations exceeding low reasoned, and three comparisons
in the opposite direction. A difference of approximately
.20 between the correlations for high reasoned and low
reasoned was needed for significance at alpha = .01, 1-tail,
using the Fisher £ to z transformation and the z-test for
differences between two correlations. Clearly, none of the
differences reached significance, nor was there any
consistent trend indicating that the hypothesized effect may
have been there, but was not detected by this study.
Table 5 presents the correlations between the belief
-
based and direct measures for the high and low intuitive
action groups. The expected pattern of results, low
intuitive greater than high intuitive, was also not found.
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Table 4
Correlations Betvp^n Bel i of^-na^^/^ r>-'^'=*^" " i er-R sed and Direct. Measures:
Reasoned Action Median Split
Target
b^iavior
Low Peascned
Action
Hic^ Reascned
Action
Voting in the election
BB-ATT 98 .50* 93 .42*
NB-SN 99 .18 93 .34*
CB-PBC 99 .43* 94 .44*
Dukakis minus Bush
difference scores
BB-ATT 98 .91* 94 .89*
NB-SN 97 .78* 94 .77*
SN = Subjective norm, CB = Control beliefs, PBC = Perceived b^vioral
control.
^lissing data deleted pairwise, thus the difference in n.
*p < .01
~
Again, a mixed pattern occurred, with two low intuitive
correlations exceeding high intuitive and three comparisons
in the opposite direction. Clearly, none of the differences
reached .20, the magnitude needed for significance, nor was
there any consistent trend. The nonsignificant correlation
between normative beliefs (NB) and subjective norm (SN) for
the low intuitive action subjects was somewhat surprising,
but the significance level for r = .22 is .013, just missing
the .01 cut-off. Given that these measures had lower
reliabilities due to low variance and almost universal
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Table 5
correlations Between R^l i Pf
-Based and nirect m...,,>.^..
Intuitive Action Median
.qp ii^-
Icw Intuitive Hi^ Intuitive
Action Action
Target
behavior
r £
Voting in the election
B&-Arr 101 .50* 90 .42*
NB-SN 102 .22 90 .28*
CB-PBC 102 .39* 91 .49*
Dukakis minus Bush
difference scores
BB-ATT 102 .89* 90 .91*
NB-SN 100 .78* 91 .77*
Note
. BB = BehaviorEd beliefs, ATT = Attitude, NB = Normative beliefs,
SN = Subjective norm, CB = Control beliefs, PBC = Perceived behavioral
control.
^tLssing data deleted pairwise, thus the difference in n.
*p < .01
agreement with the items in these measures, a search for a
further explanation did not appear warranted.
To summarize, median splits on both the Reasoned Action
and Intuitive Action Scales showed that the underlying
belief measures correlated significantly with their
respective direct measures in all but one case. However,
there was no consistent support for differential results
based on differences in action tendency.
Election Participation Intention . The next group of
results to be presented are from two-step hierarchical
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multiple regressions. m each case, the first step tested
Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975) theory of reasoned action (TRA)
.
This theory predicts intention from attitude and subjective
norm, and actual behavior from intention. The second step
tested the theory of planned behavior (TPB) outlined by
Ajzen (1985). In this approach, intention is predicted from
attitude, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control.
Behavior is then predicted from intention and perceived
behavioral control, since the major focus of this
investigation was on the TPB, results from the TRA analyses
will be discussed only to test the effect of including
perceived behavioral control in the equation. In addition,
the number of subjects (N or n) and the Pearson correlation
coefficient (r) between a predictor and the criterion appear
only in the final step of each table. Since these values do
not change across steps, they are omitted from earlier steps
in order to improve readability of the tables.
Results are presented for the entire sample, and then
for each sub-sample using median splits on first the
Reasoned Action Scale and then the Intuitive Action Scale.
The criterion variables in this section are intention to
vote in the election and actual participation in the
election. Following presentation of these results, a
summary for this section will be given.
Table 6 presents the results for the entire sample of a
two-step multiple regression regarding intention to vote in
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Table 6
Hierarchical Regressions Pogardina Fl ection Vnt-.-.^
Intention; Total Samp l<>
Total Sanple
Predicticn of Intenticn
Step l-Theory of reasoned action
Attitude
.38*
Subjective norm
.03 .39* .15b
Step 2-Theory of planned behavior
Attitude 192 .39* .32*
Subjective norm 195 .13 .03
Perceived behavioral control 195 .30* .20* .43* .19^
= Beta regression coefficient, R = Multiple oorrelaticn between the set of
raredictors and intention to vote, and r2 = Squared miltiple correlation.
2gssing data deleted pairwise, thus the difference in n.
change significant p < .01, calculated before roundlra.
*p < .01
the election. As can be seen in the table, attitude toward
voting in the election and perceived control over voting in
the election were both significant predictors of intention
to vote. Subjective norm was not a significant predictor,
in all likelihood because subjects believed important others
would be in favor of their voting, regardless of whether
subjects intended to vote. Also as predicted, adding
perceived control as specified by the TPB produced a
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significant increase in r2 (F(1,188) = 8.01, q < .oi) over
the prediction obtained from the TRA.
Table 7 presents the results of the hierarchical
regression for intention to vote in the election using the
median split on the Reasoned Action Scale. Contrary to the
hypothesis, prediction of intention to vote was not stronger
Table 7
Hierarchical Regressions Regarding Election Voting
Intention; Reasoned Action Median Split
lot Reasoned Action Hi(^ Reasoned Action
Prediction of Intention
Step 1-Tlieory of reasoned action
Attitude .45* .30*
Subjective
rearm .06 . 46* .22*^ -.02 . 29 . 08
Step 2-T3:>eory of planned behavior
Attitude 99 .46* .39* 93 .29* .23
Subjective
norm 100 .18 . 04 95 . 06 . 01
Perceived
behaviorsd
control 100 .32* .18 .50* .25 95 .26* .19 .34* .12
Note , r = Ffearscn correlation between each predictor and intention to vote, B
= Beta regression coefficient, R = Multiple correlation between the set of
predictors and intention to vote, and = Squared miltiple correlation.
^iLssing data deleted pairwise, thus the difference in 13.
^ change significant p < .01, calculated before rounding.
*P < .01
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for the high reasoned action group. m fact, the
differences between the multiple correlations were opposite
of the prediction. However, neither difference was
significant.
Furthermore, the lower part of Table 7 showed attitude
to be the only significant predictor of intention to vote,
and only for the low reasoned action group. For the high
reasoned action group, beta for attitude was marginally
significant (e < .04). in addition, perceived control did
not significantly increase r2 in either the low reasoned
action (F(l,95) = 3.76, not significant) or the high
reasoned action (F(l,89) = 3.13, not significant) group.
Further discussion regarding the results from the reasoned
action split appear below, in the summary to this section.
Table 8 presents the results of the hierarchical
regression for intention to vote in the election using the
median split on the Intuitive Action Scale. As
hypothesized, prediction of intention to vote tended to be
stronger for the low intuitive action group. However, the
difference in R was not significant.
Furthermore, the lower part of Table 8 shows attitude
to be the only significant predictor of intention to vote,
and only for the low intuitive action group. For the high
intuitive action group, beta for attitude was marginally
significant (e < '02), as was beta for perceived behavioral
control (e < .03). In addition, perceived control did not
significantly increase in either the low intuitive action
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Table 8
Hierarchical Regressions n^.n^r-r^ir.r^ Election vo^
Intention: Intuitivp. ?^ction MoHjan Sp lic-
ing
ICM Intuitive Acticn Hic^ Intuitive Acticn
^ r S B b2 B2
Prediction of Intention
Step l-Oiieory of reasoned acticn
Attituae
Subjective
norm
.42*
.35*
.01 .42*
Step 2-Theory of planned beiiavior
.18'
Attitude 102 .42*
Subjective
norm 104 .13
.37*
.02
Perceived
behavioral
control 104 .28* .18* .46* .21
.05 .36* .13^
90 .36* .26
91 .14 .04
91 .34* .23 .42* .18
Note, r = Pearson correlation between each predictor and intention to vote, Jg
= Beta regression coefficient, R = Multiple correlation between the set of
predictors and intention to vote, and = Squared miltiple correlation,
^lissing data deleted pairwise, thus the difference in n.
"R^ change significant p < .01, calculated before rounding.
*p < .01
(F(l,98) = 3.72, not significant) or the high intuitive
action, (F(l,86) = 4.64, not significant) group.
Considering the results in Tables 7 and 8, one may
wonder why the constructs in the theory predicted intention
to vote in the election so poorly. One possible answer is
that scores on the intention to vote measure were skewed
because only registered subjects were allowed to
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participate. Over the high and low groups on each median
split, the mean exceeded 12 (possible range 2-14), while the
standard deviations were relatively low (less than two).
Thus there was not a great deal to predict. Variation in
the predictors was not matched by variation in the
criterion.
Actual Election Participation
. Turning now to actual
participation in the election, Table 9 presents the multiple
regression results for the entire sample. The lower portion
of the table shows both intention and perceived control to
Table 9
Hierarchical Regressions Regarding Election Participation:
Total Sample
Total Sairple
H r B B
Predicticn of Behavior: Voting in the election
Step l-Oheory of raasGned acticn
Intention .45* .45* .20^
Step 2-aiieory of planned behavior
Intention 181 .45* .39*
Peroeived behavioral control 181 .31* .19* .49* .24^
Note . X = PBEirson correlation between each predic±or and peirticipation in the
election, Q = Beta regression coefficient, B = Moltiple correlation between
the set of predictors and peirticipation, and = Squared nuLtiple
correlation.
^2 change significant b < -Ol, calculated before rtxmding.
*p < .01
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be significant predictors of actually voting in the
election. Furthermore, adding perceived control
significantly increased r2 (F(i,i78) = 7.97, e < .oi), as
predicted by the TPB.
Table 10 presents the multiple regression results for
the high and low reasoned action groups. in opposition to
the hypothesis, prediction for the high reasoned subjects
was not better than that for the low reasoned subjects. The
trend went in the opposite direction, and the difference in
Table 10
Hierarchical Regressions Regarding Flpr.tion Participationi
Reasoned Action Median Split
Lew Raasoned Action Hic^ Reascned Acticn
Prediction of Bdiavior: Participating in the election
Step l-Theory of reasoned action
Intention .58* .58* .34^ .30* .30* .09^
Step 2-Theory of planned behavior
Intention 91 .58* .58* 90 . 30* .21
Peroeived
b^iaviorsLL
control 91 .21 .02 . 58* .34 90 . 43* .38* .48* .23^
Note . X = Pearson correlation between each predictor and participation in the
election, = Beta regression coefficient, E = Multiple correlation between
the set of predictors and participation, and r2 = Squared multiple
correlation
.
^2 change significant p < .01, calculated before rounding.
*p < .01
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R in Step 1 was marginally significant using Fisher's r to z
transformation and the z-test (e < .05). The difference in
R in Step 2 was not significant.
The bottom of Table 10 shows intention significantly
predicted participation in the election only for the low
reasoned group; for the high reasoned group it was
marginally significant (e < .04). Perceived behavioral
control was a significant predictor only for the high
reasoned group and only produced a significant change in r2
for this group (F(l,87) = 15.19, p < .01).
Table 11 presents the multiple regression results for
the high and low intuitive action groups. Prediction for
the low intuitive subjects was better than that for the high
intuitive subjects in Step 1, but not in Step 2. The
differences in R were not significant on either step.
The bottom of Table 11 shows intention significantly
predicted participation in the election for both groups.
Perceived behavioral control was a significant predictor
only for the high intuitive group and only produced a
significant change in r2 for this group (F(l,83) = 16.04, p
< .01).
Summarizing the results for intention to vote in the
election and for participation in the election, it was clear
that the hypotheses received only weak support. The basic
prediction, that high reasoned action subjects should show
stronger relationships among the constructs of the theory of
planned behavior than low reasoned action subjects, was not
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Table 11
Hierarchical Regressions Regarding
Intuitive Action Median qp ii^-
Election Participal-i on
low Intuitive Action High Intuitive Action
Predictic3n of Behavior: Participatirer in the election
Step 1-Theory of reasoned action
Intention .49* .49* .24*
.41* .41* .17a
St^ 2-Theory of plcumed b^vior
Intention 95 .49* .48* 86 .41* .28*
Perceived
behaviorsLL
control 95 .18 . 04 . 49* .24 86 . 48* .39* .55* .30*
Note , r = Pearson correlation between eacii predictor and intention to vote, B
= Beta regression coefficient, B = Multiple correlation between the set of
MTBdictors and intention to vote, and = Squared multiple correlation.
^ change significant p < .01, calculated before rounding.
*p < .01
supported. The trend appeared to be in the opposite
direction, but the differences were not significant.
One potential explanation for this trend concerns the
nature of the Reasoned Action Scale. As noted earlier, this
scale had a fairly strong relationship with social
desirability. Thus it was quite possible that the scale was
not getting at a subject's actual tendency to be more or
less reasoned, but only at his or her perception of what was
a socially desirable action tendency. Thus this scale may
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not have provided a firm basis with which to test the
differential predictability hypothesis.
The results using the Intuitive Action Scale were
somewhat more promising. They tended to support the
hypothesis of better prediction for low intuitive action
subjects as compared to high intuitive action subjects,
considering both the TPA and TPB prediction equations, three
times out of four the difference in the multiple correlation
was in the predicted direction, although not significantly
so. The absence of a strong social desirability component
to this scale may indicate a better basis for testing the
proposed action tendency mediator.
2
Finally, comparison of the results from the TRA
approach to those of the TPB approach provided support for
the hypothesis that perceived behavioral control will
significantly increase prediction for participating in the
election. This increase occurred for both intention to vote
in the election and actual participation. However, this
finding occurred only in the total sample. No consistent
pattern was found in the analyses of the subsamples using
median splits on the Reasoned Action Scale or the Intuitive
Action Scale.
Candidate Choice Intention . This section presents
hierarchical regression results for subjects' intention to
vote for a specific candidate and for their actual choice of
candidate. Recall that subjects answered questions
regarding both Michael Dukakis and George Bush. In order to
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simplify the presentation of the results, a single measure
was created for each direct construct in the TPB. This was
done by subtracting each subject's score regarding George
Bush on that measure from the corresponding score for
Michael Dukakis. For example, an intention difference score
was created by subtracting subjects' summed score on the two
intention to vote for George Bush questions from their
summed score on the two intention to vote for Michael
Dukakis questions. Similar procedures were applied to the
attitude, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control
measures
.
The first set of results are from three-step multiple
regressions, where the predictor and criterion variables are
difference scores, as described above. The first step
reflected the theory of reasoned action approach (TRA)
,
omitting perceived behavioral control. The second step
included this construct, as specified by the theory of
planned behavior (TPB)
. The third step added the evaluative
candidate preference score described at the beginning of the
results section for this chapter. This was a difference
score created from the content analysis of subjects' free-
responses regarding their intuitive reactions to each of the
major candidates. Again, the number of subjects (N or n)
and the Pearson correlation coefficient (r) between a
predictor and the criterion appear only in the final step of
each table.
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Table 12 displays the results regarding candidate
choice intention for all subjects, step 2 shows attitude
and perceived control difference scores were both
Table 12
Hierarchical Regressions ReaarHSnrj Manor r;,nHSdate Choice
Intention; Total Sample
Total Sanple
li* r B E
Prediction of Difference in Voting Intentions
Step l-Theory of reascned action
Attitude
.84*
Subjective norm
.11* ,92* .84^
Step 2-T5>eory of planned behavior
Attitude
.54*
Subjective norm ,06
Peroeived behavioral ccntrol .39* .94* .88^
St^ 3-Adkiing eveduative candidate preference
Attitirie
Subjective nonn
Peroeived behavioral oontrol
Evaluative candidate preference
note , r « Pearson correlation between each predictor difference score and the
difference in intentions to vote for eac±i major candidate, B = Beta regression
coefficient, B = Multiple correlation between the set of predictors and
intention difference score, and = Sguared multiple oorrelaticn.
^Missing data deleted pairwise, thus the difference in ij.
change significant p < .01, calculated before rcunding.
*p < .01.
194 .91* .50*
193 .67* .06
193 .89* .36*
194 .73* .10* .94* .89^
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significant predictors of the intention difference score.
These constructs also remained significant predictors with
the addition of the evaluative candidate difference score in
Step 3. This intuitive measure was also a significant
predictor. Subjective norm was not significant after
perceived behavioral control was added in Step 2.
Comparing Step l to step 2, perceived control added
significantly to the prediction of intention (F (1,189) =
66.45, E < .01). This was probably a consequence of the
mental or decisional control interpretation applied to
perceived behavioral control, as described above. Mentally
deciding whether it would be easy or difficult to vote for a
specific candidate may involve control factors. in
contrast, after forming the intention, physically choosing
the lever for that candidate should not be subject to these
control factors.
Adding evaluative candidate preference in Step 3 also
significantly increased r2 (F(1,188) = 7.36, p < .01). One
might expect a measure of voters' "gut feelings" toward the
candidates to have an impact at this level, as the intention
is being formed. Although not specifically part of the TPB,
this intuitive measure did have an impact for these
subj ects
.
The results from the median split on the Reasoned
Action Scale appear in Table 13. The pattern for the high
reasoned action subjects almost paralleled that for the low
reasoned action subjects. Attitude and perceived behavioral
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Table 13
Hierarchical Regressions Reaarr^^n^ m.^
.^ CandiH.^o nv.^.-^^
Intention: Reasoned Action Median Sp lii-
low Reascned Action High Reasoned Action
Prediction of Differenoe in Voting Intentions
Step l-Oheory of reasoned action
Attitude .85*
Subjective
norm
.10 .92* .85^
.83*
.11 .91* .83^
Step 2-'Iheory of planned behavior
Attitude .65*
.43*
Subjective
norm .07
.03
Perceived
b^vaviorEd
control .26* .93* .87^ .53* .95* ,91^
Step 3-Adding evalxiative candidate preference
Attitude 100 .92* ,57* 94 .91* .43*
Subjective
norm 98 .63* .06 95 .71* .03
Perceived
b^iavioral
control 98 .86* .23* 95 .92* .52*
Evaduative
candidate
preference 100 .75* .16* .94* .88° 94 .72* .02 .95* .91
Note , r - PearsCTi correlation between each predictor difference score and the
difference in intentiocs to vote for each major candidate, B = Beta regression
coefficient, R = Maltiple correlation between the set of predictors and
intention difference score, and R^ = Squared miltiple correlation.
^4issir^ data deleted pairwise, thus the differenoe in n.
change significant p < .01, czilculated before rtxmding.
*P < .01.
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in
control difference scores were significant predictors
both Step 2 and Step 3, while subjective norm was not
significant in either step. Perceived control significantly
increased r2 from Step l to Step 2 for high reasoned
(Z(l,90) = 70.81, E < .01) and low reasoned (Zd, 94) =
13.38, E < .01). There was no significant difference in
predictability for high reasoned subjects versus low
reasoned subjects. The trend was opposite to the prediction
of high reasoned greater than low reasoned; however, neither
difference was significant.
Candidate preference significantly increased r2 in step
3 for the low reasoned action group (F(l,93) = 9.30, e <
.01) but not for the high reasoned group (F(l,89) < 1.0, not
significant)
.
This is an interesting finding because it
implies that subjects who are low in the reasoned action
tendency may be more influenced by a measure that may be
more sensitive to their "non-reasoned" action approach.
The results from the median split on the Intuitive
Action Scale appear in Table 14. Again, the pattern for the
high intuitive action subjects was almost identical to that
for the low intuitive action subjects. Attitude and
perceived behavioral control difference scores were
significant predictors in both Step 2 and Step 3, but
subjective norm was not significant in either step.
Perceived control significantly increased from Step 1 to
Step 2 for high intuitive (F(l,87) = 41.49, p < -01) and low
intuitive (F(l,98) = 28.40, e < .01). Again the expected
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Table 14
Hierarchical P^gr^s^ i on^egardina M.Sn. r.^. j^atp r..^..
Intention; Intuitive Actinn mo^^:>» cpij^
Lew Intuitive Action High Intuitive Action
6 r B
Prediction of Differenoe in Votir^ Intentions
Step 1-Ihecjry of reasoned action
Attitude
.84*
Subjective
norm
.01 .91* .83^
Step 2-aheory of planned b^vior
Attitude
.58**
Subjective
norm „06
Perceived
behavioral
control
.35* .93* .86^
St^ 3-Adding evaluative candidate preference
Attitude 103 .91* .56*
Subjective
norm 102 .65* .06
Perceived
behavioral
<xntrol 102 .86* .34*
Evaduative
candidate
preference 104 . 66* .04 . 93* .87
B2
.85*
.11 .93* .86^
.49*
.05
.46* .95* .91^
91 .92* .42*
91 .68* .04
91 .92* .40*
90 .82* .17* .96* .92^
Note . X = Pearson correlation between each predictor difference score and the
difference in intentions to vote for each major candidate, S = Beta regression
coefficient, R = Multiple correlation between the set of predictors and
intention difference score, and = Squared multiple correlation.
^Missing data deleted pairwise, thus the difference in d.
change significant p < .01, ceLLculated before rounding.
*p < .01.
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difference in predictability between low intuitive and high
intuitive subjects was not obtained. All comparisons
between multiple correlations were contrary to the
hypothesis of low intuitive exceeding high intuitive,
although none of the differences reached significance.
The most interesting finding again occurred in Step 3,
with the addition of evaluative candidate preference. This
measure was a significant predictor for the high intuitive
action group but not significant for the low intuitive
action group, increasing r2 significantly only for the
former group (F(l,86) = 11.56, p < .01); for the latter
group it was not significant (F(l,97) < i.o, not
significant)
.
This implies that subjects differing in the
intuitive action tendency may have been influenced by
different factors. Adding an intuitively-based measure,
such as the evaluative candidate preference, did improve
prediction for precisely that group that has an intuitively-
based action tendency. This measure did not improve
prediction for subjects not relying on an intuitive action
tendency. 3 However, because the evaluative candidate
preference is not part of the TPB, no direct claim can be
made for differential prediction based only on the
constructs in the TPB. The implications regarding the
candidate preference finding will be discussed further in
Chapter 4, the general discussion to this study.
Actual Candidate Choice . The last set of results to be
presented concerns prediction of subjects' actual choice of
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presidential candidate. These results are from three-step
hierarchical multiple regressions. The predictor variables
were difference scores, as described earlier. The first
step reflected the theory of reasoned action approach (TRA)
,
predicting choice of candidate only from the intention
difference measure. The second step included the perceived
control difference score, as specified by the theory of
planned behavior (TPB)
.
The third step added the evaluative
candidate preference score previously described. As before,
the number of subjects (N or n) and the Pearson correlation
coefficient (r) between a predictor and the criterion appear
only in the final step of each table.
Turning first to the total sample, it is clear from
Table 15 that only the intention difference measure was a
significant predictor of actual candidate choice. Perceived
behavioral control was not a significant predictor (F( 1,132)
< 1.0, not significant), thus supporting the hypothesis that
this construct will increase prediction of election
participation, but not increase prediction of actual voting
choice. Recall that perceived control significantly
increased prediction of participation for the total sample
(see Table 9) . Evaluative candidate preference did not add
to the prediction of candidate choice (F( 1,131) < 1.0, not
significant)
.
Results from the median split on the Reasoned Action
Scale are in Table 16. Again, there were no significant
differences between the high and low reasoned action groups.
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Totca Sanple
U r B B
Predicticn of Behavior: Choice
Step 1-TSieory of reasoned action
Intention
Step 2-a5Teory of planned behavior
Intention
Perceived b^iavioral ccntrol
Step 3-Adding evaluative candidate preference
Intention 136 .84*
Perceived b^vioral oontrol 135 .76*
Evaluative candidate preference 135 .58*
l^gte. X = Pearscn correlation between each predictor difference score and the
difference in intentions to vote for each major candidate, B = Beta regression
coefficient, R = Multiple oonnelaticn between the set of predictors and
intention difference score, and = Squared nultiple correlation,
^tlssing data deleted pairwise, thus the difference in n.
^ change significant p < .01, calculated before rounding.
*p < .01.
although the trend of differences in R went opposite to the
prediction of high reasoned greater than low reasoned action
subjects. Intention was the only significant predictor for
candidate choice. Neither perceived behavioral control, nor
evaluative candidate preference added to the predictability
of choice (all F < 2.2, not significant). Apparently the
difference in intention to vote for one candidate over the
of Ceuididate
.84* .84*
.71b
.80*
.05 .84* .71
.81*
.06
-.04 .84* .71
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Low Reasoned Action Hi^ Reasoned Action
r B B X £ B E2
Prediction of Behavior: Choice of candidate
step 1-Theory of reasoned action
Intention .85* .85* .73b
.83* .83* .69b
Step 2-TSieory of planned behavior
Intention .94*
.61*
Peroeived
behavioral
control -.10 .85* .73
.24 .84* .70
Step 3-Adding evaluative candidate preference
Intention 70 .85* .94* 66 .83* .63*
Peroeived
b^iavioral
control 69 .73* -.10 66 .79* .28
Evaluative
candidate
preference 70 .66* .00 .85* .73 65 .51* -.08 .84* .70
Note , r s Pearson correlation between each predictor difference score and the
actual ohoioe of major candidate, B = Beta regression coefficient, B =
Maltiple correlation between the set of predictors and actual choice, and B^ =
Squared miltiple correlation.
^lissing data deleted pairwise, thus the difference in q.
change significant p < .01, calculated before rounding.
*p < .01.
other was the best predictor of actual voting choice. The
intuitively-based candidate preference appeared to influence
the process only at the intention-formation stage, and not
at the behavioral performance stage.
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Results from the median split on the Intuitive Action
scale are in Table 17. Again, there were no significant
differences between the high and low intuitive action
Table 17
Hierarchical Regressions R^a;.rri^nq Maior r;.nri.-.date chn-in^.
Intuitive Action Median Split
Lew Intuitive Action High Intuitive Action
Prediction of Behavior: C3x)ioe of caniidate
Step 1-Theory of reasoned action
Intention .81* .81* .66b .87* .87* .76b
Step 2-Taieory of planned behavior
Intention .55* .92*
Peroeived
behaviorcil
control .28 .82* .67 -.06 .87* .76
Step 3-Adding evalviative candidate preferenoe
Intention 70 .81* .59* 66 .87* .93*
Peroeived
behavioral
control 69 .79* .28 66 .73* -.06
Evsduative
candidate
preference 70 .65* -.05 .82* .67 65 .52* -.01 .87* .76
Note . X = Ffearson correlation between each predictor difference score and the
actual choice of major candidate, B = Beta regression coefficient, B =
MLiLtiple correlation between the set of predictors and actual dioioe, and
=
Squared nultiple correlation.
^^Missirg data deleted pairwise, thus the difference in .p.
change significant p < .01, calculated before rcunding.
*P < .01.
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groups, although the trend of differences in R went in the
predicted direction, low intuitive greater than high
intuitive action subjects, intention was the only
significant predictor for candidate choice. Neither
perceived behavioral control, nor evaluative candidate
preference added to the predictability of choice (all F <
2.0, not significant). Difference in intention to vote for
one candidate over the other was the best predictor of
actual voting choice, regardless of action tendency. The
intuitively-based candidate preference appeared to influence
the process only at the intention-formation stage, and not
at the behavioral performance stage.
Briefly summarizing the findings regarding choice of
candidate, there was support for the hypothesis that
perceived behavioral control should significantly increase
prediction of voting in the election, but not increase
prediction choice of a major candidate. Perceived control
also increased prediction of voting intention significantly.
While unexpected, this may be a function of different
interpretations applied to the items directly assessing
perceived control.
It is also clear that the results do not support the
hypothesized difference in predictability for subjects
differing in their action tendency. No significant
differences emerged, and the trends that were observed were
mixed in supporting the hypothesis.
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The »ost interesting finding was that prediction of
candidate voting intention differed for subjects varying in
their action tendency, as measured by „edian splits on both
the Reasoned Action and Intuitive Action Scales. Adding the
intuitively-based measure of candidate preference
significantly increased prediction for the expected groups
Of subjects, namely, the high intuitive action and low
reasoned action subjects.
The implications of these findings are in the general
discussion for this study (Chapter 4) . m addition, the
overall conclusions to be drawn from this work are
discussed.
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CHAPTER 4
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This Study had two goals. The first was the
development of a scale to measure the proposed reasoned/
intuitive action tendency. The second was the use of this
scale in a study of voting behavior, to assess the
moderating effects of action tendency on the constructs and
relationships in Ajzen's (1985) theory of planned behavior.
The anticipated unidimensional
, bipolar scale to
measure the reasoned/ intuitive action tendency was not
obtained from the procedures followed in this study.
Instead, two independent, unipolar dimensions relevant to
this study were found. The reasoned action dimension
contained items reflecting a person's tendency to consider
the consequences of his or her actions. The intuitive
action dimension contained items indicative of one's
tendency to rely on intuitive feelings as the basis for
action.
The Reasoned Action Scale had a relatively strong
social desirability component, in addition to overlapping
with the Need for Cognition Scale (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986)
and the Action Control Scale (Kuhl, 1985). The influence of
social desirability may mean that this scale will not
adequately test for differences based on a "true" action
tendency, if subjects' responses are influenced by factors
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unrelated to this action tendency. This may account for the
.ixed pattern of results when comparing high reasoned action
subjects to low reasoned action subjects.
The intuitive Action Scale avoided the problems
confronting the Reasoned Action Scale, m fact, intuitive
action was related only to the Private Self-consciousness
scale (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975) at a moderate
level. This scale may therefore be more appropriate in
testing for differences based on a "true" difference in
action tendency.
Analyses using both measures of action tendency were
conducted on data regarding voting in the 1988 U.S.
Presidential election. The primary hypothesis of
differential predictability for subjects differing in their
action tendency was not confirmed. m fact, no significant
differences were obtained and there was no consistent trend
to the results that would suggest even weak support for this
hypothesis.
One interpretation for these results is that the theory
of planned behavior is more robust than previously assumed.
That is, if the action tendency measures did differentiate
between subjects presumably captured by the theory and those
not captured by it, then the theory performed equally well
for both groups of subjects.
Another possible explanation for this absence may be
that the method of assessing the constructs of the theory of
planned behavior through behavior-specific measures will not
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discriminate between subjects with differing action
tendencies. That is to say, regardless of whether one tends
to be high or low in reasoned action or intuitive action,
one's intention and behavior can be predicted al.ost equllly
well from the constructs of the theory, what may be needed
is a measure that is potentially more sensitive to the
effects of action tendency.
support for this idea was obtained from analyses that
included an intuitively-based measure of subjects'
evaluative preference for Michael Dukakis and George Bush.
Adding this construct to those specified in the theory of
planned behavior increased prediction of intention for
subjects expected to be influenced by such a measure, namely
the low reasoned action and high intuitive action subjects.
It did not increase prediction of intention for high
reasoned action and low intuitive action subjects. No
increase in behavioral predictability of actual voting
choice for any group was found when evaluative candidate
preference was added. Apparently, once the intention has
been formed it is the best predictor of behavior, regardless
of one's action tendency. Action tendency does seem to play
a role in intention formation. However, this effect was
small, only increasing the variance accounted for by one
percent. The effect was also not found for the total
sample, only for the two subsamples mentioned.
The finding that evaluative candidate preference
influenced both low reasoned and high intuitive action
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subjects was somewhat unexpected, if this candidate
preference measure really was an intuitively-based Measure
Recall that the Reasoned Action and Intuitive Action Scales
used were virtually independent of one another, thus an
intuitive measure might not have been relevant to the
reasoned action tendency, since it did improve
predictability for the low reasoned group, the intuitive
basis of this measure may be questionable. Perhaps
evaluative candidate preference has a different basis, one
that was related to both the reasoned and intuitive action
tendencies.
In fact, examination of the candidate preference
measure suggests that what it really measured was subjects'
attitudes toward the candidates. Interpreting the measure
in this way then clarifies its applicability toward both
intuitive and reasoned action subjects. Regardless of
action tendency, an attitude toward the candidate could be
relevant. However, as the results show, this relevance
appears limited to low reasoned and high intuitive subjects.
Attitude toward an object or person is not part of the
theory of planned behavior. One interpretation of these
results is that this construct is not important for subjects
who are well captured by the reasoned approach of the theory
of planned behavior (e.g. high reasoned and low intuitive
subjects)
.
Attitude toward the object does appear to be
important, however, for subjects captured less accurately by
the theory (e.g. low reasoned and high intuitive subjects) .
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Thus, it .ay be desirable to include such a measure in
future research, in order to obtain better predictability
for all subjects, regardless of their action tendency.
The hypothesis that perceived behavioral control should
increase prediction of election participation but not
increase prediction of actual candidate choice was
confirmed. Because participating in an election is not
entirely under an individual's control, one's perception of
impeding or facilitating factors apparently influences this
behavior. Actually choosing a candidate was not expected to
be subject to such factors, and the results appear to
support this.
Perceived control did improve prediction of subjects'
relative intention to vote for one candidate or the other.
This was unexpected, but in all likelihood, it resulted from
subjects interpreting the question regarding the ease or
difficulty associated with voting for a specific candidate
in an unanticipated fashion. Thus, subjects may have
perceived some mental or decisional control factors as
influencing their intention. The implication is that
perceived control questions need to be evaluated more
carefully, looking for any unexpected interpretations, prior
to their inclusion in a particular study.
Finally, it can be said that the measures of general
action tendency produced no moderating effect on the
attitude-behavior relationship within the context of the
theory of planned behavior. The theory appears to be robust
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with respect to general individual difference variables
What ™ay be need is a More-behavior specific measure of
action tendency. Thus Moderating effects for a particular
behavioral domain nay be found among individuals who differ
in their action tendency with respect to that domain.
initial support for a small moderating effect of action
tendency was obtained in an unexpected manner. Using an
assessment technique that may be more sensitive to subjects
Who differ from the reasoned action approach, increased
predictability was obtained for the expected groups of
subjects.
Further research is clearly needed on the nature of the
scales measuring action tendency, it may be desirable to
continue work on developing a unidimensional, bipolar
measure of action tendency. Perhaps the items from the
Intuitive Action Scale could be combined with items from the
Reasoned Action Scale that are low in social desirability as
a beginning for a new scale. Behavior-specific measures of
action tendency may also need to be developed.
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APPENDIX A
MATERIALS USED IN STUDY 1
84
Materials in Study l, Part 1
I n
Informed Constant Form
Informed Consent
present study, we a" ^i':,; n^" ?u::^,r"::J°^"^-about a number of topics relatL ! _^P^«^er ences and oolnlonsbe asked to fill out a Lnoln ? everyday life. You win also
aODrox.mately Jhree wee" °n 3lml,ar topics ,n
you rn'Lrsrn\c.i'. co^ ioESltJ^^^^our*^^ONLY required so that data from hr^In student ID number Is
:::: »r;eer:=;/-,«?:; H ' r '"^"-""-^
one credit for this session. 545-0252 to receive the
w.thouTa:rio:ror;r::i?%:;nr"°" ^-^^ - time
If you have any questions, please feel free to ask them now.
section/""" '° Diease complete the following
S'fl"*^"'"" Student 10 #
Printed Name Phone number
mTioT Age Sex
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* true
01. I have few strong convictions.
02. I am generally known as a person of r«», , ,
reasonable person.
"^^^^ °'
^af^er than a consistently
03.
,
avoid interacting with computers as much as possible
04. -nn. It.iff.culttoaskother people to .o things for
.e
_
05.
,
can usual,, tell ,f a new song ,s going to be a hit when
, first hear .
—
-c^;t:ru%:;:;::eVSi^?c:u:er
'
^^"^"^
^° .
,
07. When filling out forms (an application for™instructions before filling in any blanks
'"-"P'^). I carefully read the
08. I usually have clear, explainable reasons for my decisions.
— ZosV,T.V. °" ^" ' --.ly give careful consideration to the
10. I tend to waver back and forth before making an important decision.
nhrS:":?a;?on"^" • °- -^ore responding
"Tn,\olT. " ^"•^"^ ^ ' t know the r,ght
13. I have to work at being spontaneous.
ihll'r'acJlonl"'"" '° ^'^^'^ ^ood reasons for
15. Most people I know are better organized than i am.
16. Many times, tears come to my eyes when l watch a sad movie or television snow.
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Completely mTTTTIT 5
—
7-.— * <:
.
.
'
Mainiy Part v trim sl r.— 5
partly
';;:3e ";;,7 cSS;FiiTIT7
true
17. I seldom make promises
I cannot keep.
18. I am usually sympathetic to others.
— - ^— Often comes to me most easily
.hen
, .on. th,nk
20. I tend to delay making decisions until it Is too late.
21. I usually find It is easy to «!«fti«
'natter. '° disagreements by reviewing the facts of the
22. When I am m doubt about a course of action , ,
23. I sometimes show too little emotion.
:;rtru::.""'" • '^'-g and when they are te.Mn,
25. I tend to be more enthusiastic about things than the average person.
26. I find waiting In line extremely annoying.
27. When
,
am with other people.
,
tend to point out alternative courses of act,on.
28. I can easily form close relationships with members of my own sex.
29. I usually accept other people's feelings as the basis for their actions.
30. I am generally on time for appointments.
31. I typically avoid taking chances on Friday the 13th.
32. When^in the company of friends.
, rarely am the one to decide what we are go,ng
oth":;sr ^'^^^ "^•^ ''^^^^ ^-^^ — to suggest
34. I usually think about what l want to say before
, speak up in a group.
35. Most times I can feel right away when another person doesn't like me.
36. I typically know when I have hurt somebody without having to be told.
37. I am often reluctant to do something just because I feel like It.
38. When I wake up. I generally know right away if It will be a bad day.
39. I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions.
40. Before going shopping for groceries. I usually prepare a thorough lis: of items
needed
.
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ComDletely Mainly Partl y tm. T — 5
'"^"^ true
41. I often act Impulsively.
Jrthe^rsSp:;:^^;""'""' • --tl.es nn. .yse.r .eing aUecte.
I'^SreisT^ro? ZrZson.^'''''''
'^^^ ^-'t'- or negat.e
44. I ..II Often .o things
,
.on't enjoy out of a sense or .uty or ot„i,at,on
a;;H:^^:^::?e?^ar:rt-.r::°;,~^ -are t.
.
46. I^can usually tel, w.et.er a person ,s happy or sa. Py just looking at or
; ions.
47.
,
generally find It easy to .eep wor.Ing In the face of tempting
.istract,
iM^gn'ha;:^^ '"^ '^^^ ^^^'^ ' -^'^-^ <='^-3« t.e
49. I have a hard time making friends.
.
50. I try to weigh all the pros and cons before making a decision.
51. It typically does not bother me If a black cat crosses my path.
sS^^thCSIS' '°
'
'''' "'"^ '° ''^'-"^
sense.
°' " °^ ^«
'
' s'-'th
iel7abourt;2m'"'""'°"' °' ' ^ 9^"^
55. I have no clear Idea of what my life will be like 10 years from now.
56. I keep a careful record of my expenses.
57. I have sometimes missed out on opportunities because I couldn't make up my
m i nd
.
58. I usually have assignments ready on time.
59. Sometimes I feel that something Is wrong even before I get the bad news.
60. I sometimes let events or other people make up my mind for me.
61. It doesn't bother me to act unreasonably.
62. When It comes to trusting other people, I can usually rely on my "gut
feel Ings.
"
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Comoletely Mainly Partly true I §false false partly false
t
Completely
true
63. I generally am a logical person.
64. once
,
have made a plan, i tend to follow It to Its completion.
65. I normally avoid working on projects that r«n.,ir- ,
preparation. ' equi e a great deal of planning and
66. I find It difficult to put the reasons for my actions Into words.
67. I usually say what is on my mind.
.
68. I am typically a sentimental person.
69. I am rarely afraid In the dark.
70. I sometimes take on more responsibilities than I can easily handle.
71. When I have decided to do something, i tend to "sit on it- f^r , k,,begin to carry It out. ^ before i
72. I careful ly plan my dal ly schedule of activities.
.
73. I can easily defend both sides of an Issue.
—_
74. In most situations. I know that what I am doing Is right.
,
75. I try to make sure that my Judgments are not Influenced by my emotions.
76. When getting dressed. I know Immediately what I want to wear.
—_
77. Candidates for political office all tend to look alike to me.
78. I can typically sense right away when a person Is lying.
.
79. When I have many Important things to take care of. I sometimes don't know whereto begin.
80. I often have a hard time Imagining myself In another person's position.
81. I know when something is right or wrong even If I sometimes cannot Justify myfee I Ing. ^ j r
82. When i have several errands to run or things to do. I tend to make a written
list to be sure that I don't forget anything.
83. My initial impressions of other people often turn out to be wrong.
84. My behavior Is quite predictable to those who know me.
95. For important decisions I tend to do the logical thing, no matter how i feel
about the situation.
86. I don't worry much about the future.
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Mainly Part ly trua g,
'alse parti a,sa cE^^^^^TT^^' true
t rue
_
87. When i cant decide what tn rt« i
.
aa, ,
,^
^ ^^^^^^
^^^^^
.
90. When insulted or angered,
i usually think .late. '"""^ ^'^'"'^ o' a good reply only after
.t ,s too
.
3- in a restaurant.
,
ty..caMy
.no. right a.ay what
, want to order.
.
92. When necessary,
i can be very assertive.
-
'-incts When deciding o course o. action.
9*. I hate to be kept waiting.
95. I tend to avoid activities that Involve risk or danger.
96. I generally kno. what I want out or life and how to get It.
98. I usually sense right awav whath.r , «sni y whether a person is trustworthy or not.
99. I typically keep my feelings to myself.
100. I have a tendency to act without thinking about the consecuence,
.
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you and then Crce the appropr
, ate "eU^lTT": l^.^^"? !Mts"." ^^^'"^ ^°
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
ZV.nZlZ'. auanncat.ons o. a,,
I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trout,, e.
inco:r:g:::'"' '° °" ^'^^ ^or, i f i am not
I have never Intensely dislike anyone.
On^occaslon I have had doubts about my ability to succeed In
I sometimes feel resentful when i don t get my way.
I am always careful about my manner of dress.
My table manners at home are as good as when i eat out In a
restaurant . m
If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure l was notseen, I would probably do 1 1
.
On a few occasions. I have given up doing something because Ithought too little of my ability.
I I Ike to gossip at t Imes.
There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people
In authority even though l knew they were right.
No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener.
I can remember "playing sick" to get out of something.
There have been occasions when i took advantage of someone.
I'm always willing to admit when l made a mistake.
I always try to practice what I preach.
I don't find It particularly difficult to get along with loud-
mouthed, obnoxious people.
I sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive and forget.
When I don't know something I don't at all mind
admitting It.
I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.
At times I have really Insisted on having things my own way.
There have been occasions when l felt like smashing things.
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I would never think of iAtti„^
wrongdoings. ^^'"^ *" s» Punished for my
I never resent being asked to return a favor.
; "l^enrfJoH oT ^
I never make a long trip without checking the safety of n,y car,
There have been times when i wa<! m.it- i^,,
fortune of others. ^ " °^ ^^^^ 300«^
I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off.
I am sometimes Irritated by people who ask favors of me.
1
have never felt that I was punished without cause.
:h:r:s:rde::;i"'" '^-^ ^ ^'^^ -'^ ^ot
lee^Ings"'*'
^"""•'''^•'y "Id something that hurt someone's
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Action Control
f Ruhi
, 1 00.)
I
.
When I have to woric at home
I often find It difficult to get started
'
usually start right away
2. When I lose something of value and can't find it
I have a hard time getting over it
I soon stoD thinlcing about it
3. When some task is waiting for me
l^often thinic how nice It would be I f I had already talcen care of
I focus my attention on how I can quickly get It done
4. When
1
have worked on a project for weeks and everything turns out wrong
takes a long time before i get over it
'
ipnt let It bother ma for very long
5. When I get lucky unexpectedly
I think about It over and over again
'
don't thing about It very long
6. When I feel like renewing an acquaintance
'
immediately try to arrange a time for a meeting
'
decide to do It sometime soon
7. When I am idle a: home and feel like doing something
'
quickly decide what to do and don't think much about other
poss I b 1 1 1 1 1 ss
I carefully consider several possibilities before making up my
m I nd
.
3. When i have a lot of Important things to take care of
i often don t know where to begin
it is easy for me to make a plan and then stick to it
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When I have accomoMshed something really ia,portant
I soon start thinking about other matters
I can't think about anything else at first
When something breaks down uneiDectedly
it takes a while before I can get myself to do something about
I undertake the necessary steps Immediately
When I accidentally drop a new appliance
I concentrate fully on what should be done
I can-t stop thinking about how this could have happened
TuTcelsYu' :r:r'"'
'''' ''^^ "-^^^ ^^••^
>
am
I keep thinking about how everything seems to be going my way
I soon think about other matters
After repeatedly winning an Interesting game
I like to turn to other things for a change
I could play on and on
When I have to do something unpleasant but Important
'
prefer to do It right away
I avoid doing it until It Is absolutely necessary
When my work receives an unexpectedly negative evaluation
It takes a while before I get over my disappointment
I redouble my efforts
If I won a great deal of money (e.g.. In the lottery)
I would Immediately think about what to do with the money
'
would keep thinking about how lucky I had been
When something that is Important to me keeps going wrong
I gradually get discouraged
'
forget about It for a while and do something else
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18. Whan
19. After
20. After
21. When
22. Whan
23. After
not Ice that i have been used
can't stoD thinicing about it for a long time
soon forget about it
performing extremely well m an imoortant contest
like nothing better than to keep going
like to do something else for a change
receiving an award for outstanding achievement
like to keep practicing my skills ,n the same subject matter
prefer to turn my attention to a different subject matter
several things go wrong for me on the same day
really don't know what to do with myself
can still carry on as though nothing had happened
have a hard time bringing myself to deal with a difficult problem
the problem looms like a mountain
try to find a way of tackling the problem without overly
nconvenlencing myself
winning decisively at a game
soon lose interest In the game
am eager to keep playing
24. When
th Ings
have decided to buy Just one item of clothing and I find several
I I Ike
often waver back and fort, trying to decide which i should buy
usually dont think much about it and make a quick decision
95
Need for cmmtion
^pettv , n.^s.^
r", — 1)
Please rate the extent to which each of th« frM ,
uncharacteristic of you. Use the foUowlHg scale ' "
'^'^^^^^^^^
' i c or
1
.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11 .
12.
13.
U.
15.
17,
18.
0 - not at all characteristic of you
4 - extremely characteristic of you.
I would prefer complex to simple problems.
Thinking is not my idea of fun.
I would rather do something that requires little thonnht th,nsomething that is sure to challenge'my th I ^g^^ M??Is
I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is lilceivChance i wi I i have to think In depth about sometMng.
'
I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.
I only think as hard as I have to.
I prefer to think about small, dally projects to long-term ones.
I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them.
tJ*n,r"
°^ ^«'y'"9 on thought to make my way to the top appeals
I really enjoy a task that Involves coming up with new solutionsto problems.
Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much.
I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that 1 must solve.
The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.
I would prefer a task that Is Intellectual, difficult, and
Important to one that is somewhat Important but does not require
much thoughts.
'
'oel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task
that required a lot of mental effort.
It's enough for me that something gets the Job done; I don't
care how or why it works.
I usually end up deliberating about Issues even when they do not
affect me personal ly.
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Materials in study l, Part 2
Informed Consent For-m
I nformed Consent
The Psychology Oepartment require., th,^ ,,Dsychologicai studies sign an Informix ^" P^^^ ' <= i Dants ,npresent study, we are examlJ?n; s?udents°T"^about a number of topics related to ! Preferences and opinionsSECOND PART OF TH I S STUDY
. tp Jo^ 'ri^OT'^ ' S I S THESTOP AND TELL THE EXPERIMENTER NOW.
COMPLETE PART 1 PLEASE
The questionnaire Is s*» i f
TMS cove. ,„,e.
-oe^^l^J/t^r
i
.
For Dart Id pat I ng in this eyn.rim«„*
experimental credits. At the ehd of Tn?^
"
wMl be provided. This sM^'snould be ur^rin^to '^'"^ ^'^^or teaching assistant. if you have anv ° Professor
or are Interested In the resClts ple^L^"^"!'""^ ^^'^ ^^^^yTobin 627. 545-0252.
"^es^'^ . ase contact Andrew Watters.
You may discontinue par 1 1 c i oat i nn in *.k« ...
without any loss of credt? elrneS ' "''^^ ^
If you have any questions, please fee. free to as. them now,
the q::s^?^n;^:r:.^%s:^r^;s-:o% y^r^ti^^^^nS^^r —
-
Darts Of this study. ^ ^
o-" our t me and assistance in both
S
I
gnature Student id »
Pr I nted Name
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Initial loo Pppisoned/Tn-Hnj t ive Action Item Set Rppg>;:.^-^^
Please rate each of the following I terns for how character i .st i r «r k
It IS of you. Use the fol lowing scale:
is ic or uncharacteristic
0 - not at all characteristic of you
4 - extremely characteristic of you
1
.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
I'm always trying to figure myself out.
Generally, I'm not very aware of myself.
I reflect about myself a lot.
i 'm often the subject of my own fantasies.
I never scrutinize myself.
I'm generally attentive to my inner feelings.
I'm constantly examining my motives.
I sometimes have the feeling that I'm off somewhere watching
mysel f
.
I'm alert to changes In my mood.
I'm aware of the way my mind works when I woric through a
problem.
98
Self-Monitoring (.c;ny^^^^^_^^
The following statements concern your o*rc«n,,
situations. No two statements are e acn ^m/" '° ' °' differentcarefully oefore answering. if a smellnt r^nf "^'^ statement
ycu. crce the T m fron? of he llllTZl Jf . Tt"^'''' toUSUALLY TRUE as aDDlied to you Circle tSe F
statement if false or NOT
1 . T
2. T
4. T
5. T
6. T
7. T
8. T
9. T
10. T
n . T
12. T
13. T
14. T
15. T
16. T
17. T
13. T
19. T
20. T
I nnd It hard to Imitate the behavior of other people.
attu:::ra;^ ::m:;:.^" - ^-^.s,
".ngr;::t^o;h:?:'::,r;?:;:"^^- ^--^ - -
I can only argue for Ideas which i already believe.
a.::stdz;:j;on""^'" °" ^''-^ -'<=^
I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain people.
^Jrh-hf, '° ^ situation. 1 loolc tothe be avior of others for cues.
I would probably make a good actor,
or'musl^."*''' ™'
'°
Ih^rriT '° '° experiencing deeper emot.onsthan I actual ly am.
I laugh more when I watch a comedy with others than alone.
In a group of people i am rarely the center of attention.
in different situations and with different people. I often actMKe very different persons.
I am not particularly good at malcing other people like me.
Even ff I am not enjoying myself. I often pretend to be having a
good 1 1 me
.
I'm not always the person l appear to be.
I would not Change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order
to please someone else or win their favor.
I have considered being an entertainer.
In order to get along and be liked. I tend to be what people
expect me to be rather than anything else.
I have never been good at games like charades or improv i sat lona
i
act I ng
.
I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and
different situations.
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At a party
,
,et otners
,eeo the ;oKes an. stories go,ng.
Is'TLlu^,'
^"^"^
""'-"^
^° 3how uo 30 wen
i.ryo;Trt;r:n;"/^' ^«MaMe.,thastra„nt .ace
i^.ay
.ece.va oeop.et,y
.,i„g rrien.iyw.en
, really „sM.e
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Theory of Plannpri nc.y.^.r^^^ r^h vi • • ^ ^ •
We are also interested in on*, oth-,,
been addressed in the Prev?CCs J^:;,^^^^'
; "fe situation that has not
the 1988 presidential eiectTon "eaS^^Il^"- ^ situation concernsthe upcoming election. Then complete the ^o I ' "
'°
situation by listing the responses thatput 1 Item per space. YOU DO NOT havfIMMEDIATELY TO MIND. Please go on to th. no .
'isted ail Items that came lm^ed?ate?y 5o Tnl''"^^^'°"
think about
owing questions about thisCOME IMMEDIATELY TO MIND. PleaseTO LIST SEVEN IF FEWER COME
:?:ct?onr " advantages of your voting In the 1988 president
1
.
2.
3.
4
.
5.
6.
7 .
1 .
2.
3.
4
.
5.
6.
7.
^aL*^^^*,!"^ groups or people who would approve of your voting in the1988 presidential election?
1 .
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7 .
Are there any groups or people who would disapprove of your voting in the1988 presidential election?
1 .
2.
3.
4 .
5.
6.
7 .
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What factors do you see that wou i n «1988 presidential election? easier for you to vote m tr
1 .
2.
3 .
4
.
5.
6.
7 .
What factors do you see that would make It diffi^.,,* .the 1988 Dresidenttal election? icult for you to vote I
n
1 .
2.
3.
4 .
5.
6.
7
.
Dr
1 .
2 .
3.
4
.
5.
6.
7
.
Please describe the feelings you have when you think about voting m tne1988 presidential election. ^
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1.
2 .
3 .
4 .
5.
6.
7 .
Z'inT,ni
':n:t?:'r'
°'
1
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7 .
Are there any groups or people who would approve of your voting forMichael Dukakis In the 1988 presidential election?
1 .
2.
3.
4,
5.
Are there any groups or people who would disapprove of your voting forMichael Dukakis in the 1988 presidential election?
1 .
2 .
3 .
4 .
5.
6 .
7 .
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What factors do you see that won i n ™
M.chae, Duka.,s ,n the 1988 or es , 'en?^ : , ' e . "t I on
'°
1 .
2 .
3 .
4
.
5.
6.
7,
What factors do you see that would make it mf*i^..,*. r
Micnae. Dukakis in the 1988 president iL eiecH in? °'
'°
I'' !k*''!««2^^^'"^ associate with your voting for Michael Dukakn the 1988 presidential election? ^n i u
1 .
2.
3.
4
.
5.
6.
7 .
Please describe the feelings you have when you think about voting forMichael Dukakis In the 1988 presidential election.
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study 1 Sub-iect. FAedbacV g>.^^
Preferences and Opinions Feedback
.easu;e^^";^s?:lS:.^;^:re^c:^oVer^^^ questionnaire to
c:^;ru!^/:^o;rrn^- -° ^rrLidenCv t: T.^r-
-
"out %eeMnf"^^w'° spontaneously, golng'w.th one s
tendency
"""^
' spontaneous or Intuitive action
*w
5"«'*'°""a"-e developed with your help will be used in
Vrrl'.tl'^VT " possible to better predict behavior
!k
°'' "'^'^ * reasoned action tendency than forpeople with a spontaneous action tendency. In addition your
responses to the election questions will be used to createquestionnaires for future studies of voting behavior.
Thank you very much for your participation in this study.
If you have any questions or comments about any aspect of this
study, please feel free to discuss them with the experimenterbefore you leave.
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APPENDIX B
ACTION TENDENCY SCALES
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INEFFECTIVENESS SCALE
Response Scale: l - Completely untrue of me
5 - Completely true of me
* Item reverse scored
* When necessary, i can be very assertive.
* I usually say what is on my mind.
cou^dn'^m^^rup m^^Ind?^" °^ opportunities because I
* I^generally know what I want out of life and how to get
Jf'^?.^^^''^^!!'^ ^^^^^ a personal problem, I oftendon't know the right thing to say.
* IIJ '""''^'^ live the last few years over again, I wouldn'tchange many of the things I have done.
When I have many important things to take care of isometimes don't know where to begin. '
I have a hard time making friends.
I tend to waver back and forth before making an importantdecision. = r-
When insulted or angered, I usually think of a good reply
only after it is too late.
When in the company of friends, I rarely am the one todecide what we are going to do.
I have no clear idea of what my life will be like 10 years
from now.
When something good happens to me, I find that it is
likely to be balanced by something bad.
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REASONED ACTION SCALE
Response Scale: 1 - Completely untrue of me
5 - Completely true of me
* Item reverse scored
Before taking a stand on an issue, I usually give careful
consideration to the opposing sides.
I try to make sure that my judgments are not influenced bymy emotions. ^
I usually have clear, explainable reasons for mydecisions.
* I have a tendency to act without thinking about the
consequences.
For important decisions I tend to do the logical thing, no
matter how I feel about the situation.
I try to weigh all the pros and cons before making a
decision.
Before buying an appliance or item of clothing, I
carefully compare the available alternatives in terms of
price and quality.
When provoked to anger by another person, I try to cool
off before responding to the provocation.
I generally am a logical person.
When filling out forms (an application form, for example)
,
I carefully read the instructions before filling in any
blanks.
I usually find it is easy to settle disagreements by
reviewing the facts of the matter.
* Candidates for political office all tend to look alike to
me
.
I can easily defend both sides of an issue.
* I generally don't think about tomorrow's tasks until it is
time to do them.
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INTUITIVE ACTION SCALE
Response Scale: l - Completely untrue of me
5 - Completely true of me
lo^^isTr. r.ris iLi^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ or
I can typically sense right away when a person is lying.
I know when something is right or wrona even i f tsometimes cannot justify my feeling
I^usually sense right away whether a person is trustworthy
av^ifit?^''
^"^^i^i^^ly When to take a chance and when to
thrbarnewsf""' —thing is wrong even before I get
I can usually tell whether a person is happy or sad byDUst looking at him or her. ^
doesn't'^like Se?
'''^^^ ^^^^
^^'"gSriLungs?"''"^ ^ ^^^^^^
I typically know when I have hurt somebody without havingto be told. ^
I usually trust my instincts when deciding on a new course
of action.
I can usually tell if a new song is going to be a hit when
I first hear it.
I avoid interacting with computers as much as possible.
The solution to a problem often comes to me most easily
when I don't think about it.
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APPENDIX C
MATERIALS USED IN STUDY 2
V
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Informed Constant Form
Informed Consent
The Psychology Department requires thatpsychological studies sign an infor^o^ " Participants inpresent study, we are eximining ftS^^l""^^"^ I" theregarding the 1988 preside^Jlal iTeclTon "5^^^"^" opinionscomplete a questionnaire on this toniJ \ °" "^^^ tofollowing the election some st^den^s mAv ^PP^^^^^^tely one weekfew follow-up questions. ^^'^^ent ay be telephoned and asked a
The questionnaire is self-extilana+-r.r-.,
give will be STRICTLY CONFlSOT^AL^^h. ^^^^
will be the only identificatioJ b^^ause tM^^ ""^^^ °"removed after the follow-up quest!^^rhaJ^^LeT:LKe%ndr'''
:eje??^:i?S^^SIij^Siidi:S!r?:S;J^^ wm receive one
questionnaire. You may discontinue n^^^?
'=°"Pletion of the
any time without any loss ofcreSit. ^^^^^
t"hL"!L^?^"^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^ thi%°e';i.L\^ra?"
The following questions may appear similar k
Ts.^inl'!'''''^^'
-^-se^ea^d^ e^ch^^qi^^^i^^ caJ^JulJ^^L^f
If you have any questions, please feel free to ask them now.
JL^^esI^nnaL^"^'"'^'""' ^^^^ -»Plete
Signature Student ID #
Printed Name Telephone #
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Intuitive Reactions -ho n^nfjigTh^
Please describe your "gut feelinas" ni- cnr^A
other wonis, disLgardi^ SrStioL^fSl when ycu see George Bush, m
Please list in sSSl?Sses yS fS ^So^T""^' ^ acrSs to you
ri^Ji^^'^ ""^ feelings" or etiotional reactions when ycu see Michael Dukakis
fiease list in short phrases your first reactions. ^
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Theory of Plannf^ri Behavin-r z^-
-zen, 1985) Quest- innr.:>iT-
Instructic3ns
Mcjst questions in this survey niake use of ratinrr
ycu are to CIRCLE THE NUMBER that ri^^ Places; for these questions
ay us€
For exanple, if ycu were asked to rate "The Weather in a™h^,^H _^places should be interpr^ as fouZ^- w Amherst" on such a scale, the 7
I hE aTbS desSS2 S^"'^ 'slighUy different fonnat that wilfS SS^S i^^on2S.^'°^ ""^ ^
nterpreted llows
The weather in Anherst is:
good
extranely quite slig^y neiJher sli^Uy quite extiiely
^ ^^^^ ^ ^'^y ^' then you wc^^
good 0
The weather in Amherst is:
2 3 4 5 bad
folSSsf^ ^ is quite bad, then you would circle the number 6 as
good
The weather in Amherst is:
2 3 4 5
; 6 ; bad
follSsf^ ^ ^ ^ ^^^^'^y circle the number 3 a
good
The weather in Amherst is:
2 (T^ 4 5 bad
If you think the weather in Amherst is neither good nor bad, then you would circle the
number 4 as follows:
good
The weather in Amherst is:
bad
IN MAKTNG YCUR RATINGS, PI£ASE REMEMBER THE FXDUDWING POINIS:
1. Please circle the number that best r^resents your opinion.
good 1^
THIS
5
'
NOT Tins
2. Please make sure your circle covers only ans number.
3. Please be sure to answer all items - do not emit any.
bad
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«trinely c^te sUg^y naikr sl^tly qite extrLly
1. I intend to vote in the 1988 presidential election.
liJ^y 1 2 3 4 5
My voting in the 1988 presidential election is
2. harmful 123
3.
4.
happy
wise
5. unpleasant
6. good
unlikely
beneficial
sad
foolish
pleasant
bad
p^^SnSS'iSiS" "^"^ to think I shculd/should not vote in the 1988
^ 2 3 4 5 6 7 Should not
i-nJ^JT^^^
speaking, I want to do what nost f»cple who are i^rtant to me think I
^^^4 5 6 7 very muchshould donot at all
9^^^^^^ing in the 1988 presidential election I will have a say in who runs the
likely
unlikely
10. By voting in the 1988 presidential election I will take part in a denccracy.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unlikely
11. By voting in the 1988 presidential election I will help my candidate win.
likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unlikely
12. By voting in the 1988 presidential election I will keep an unwanted candidate fran
winning.
likely unlikely
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.^
, ? 3 4 5 6 7
extranely <^te sUghtly neither sUghtly quite extranely
13. By voting in the 1988 presidential elec±iQn I will have my opinion cxjunted.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unliJcely
14. By voting in the 1988 presidential election I will be exercising niy right to vote.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unliJcely
15. By voting in the 1988 presidential election I will influence policies iitportant to
6 7 unliJcely
me.
lUcely 1 2 3 4 5
16. By voting in the 1988 presidential election I will make a difference.
liJcely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unliJcely
17. If I vote in the 1988 presidential election I would be casting a vote without nuch
Icnowledge of the candidates.
liJcely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unliJcely
18. If I vote in the 1988 presidential election I might later come to regret the choice
I made.
liJcely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unliJcely
19. IkM nuch control do you have over voting in the 1988 presidential election?
no ocnplete
control 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 control
20. Having a say in vho runs the country is
good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 bad
21. TaJcing part in a deuioci-acy is
good 1234567bad
22. Helping my candidate win is
good l234567bad
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J- 2 3 4 5 6 7
octxenely cjiite sUc^y neither slightly quite extranely
23. Keeping an unwanted cardidate fran winning is
90ad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 bad
24. Having my opinicn counted is
good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 bad
25. Exercising my right to vote is
good 1234567bad
26. Influencing policies important to me is
good 1234567bad
27. Making a difference is
good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 bad
28. Casting a vote without ituch knowledge of the candidates is
good 1234567bad
29. My later ccming to regret the choice I made in an election is
good 1234567bad
30. How easy or difficult would it be for you to vote in the 1988 presidential
election?
easy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 difficult
31. Michael Dukakis' supporters would approve of my voting in the 1988 presidential
election, regazrlless of who I vote for.
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
32. My parents would approve of my voting in the 1988 presidential election, regardless
of who I vote for.
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very nuch
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extxLly Jte sligLy neikr ^^tly J,^ ^.^^
not at all i 2 3 4 =
° 7 very much
34. George ftosh wculd approve of my votijtj in the l9fifl nr»c.^^« , ,
regardless of who I vote for.
m me 1988 presidential election,
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 ^
" ' very much
35. Michael Cukakis wculd approve of my votina in the iqah r.r^i^ ^- .
regardless of who I vote forT ^ ^® presidential election,
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 «^ 7 very much
36. My friends wculd approve of my votiixj in the 1988 nn«:irtani-^,i t
of who I vote for.
»d oi lyua presidential election, regardless
^e^SSTr^'eS^'STz'^ of «y vcti., i. 1,88 pr^i^ial
not at all 1234567
_w^ ' ° 7 very much
°^ ^'^^ ^ ^ 1988 presidential electionregardless of who I vote for, '=x=»->.iuii,
notatalli2345fi-,
_^* ^ ° 7 very much
39. Society in general waild approve of my voting in the 1988 presidential election
regaxnless of who I vote for. '
not at all 1234r<;-7 _^" > 4 5 6 7 very nuch
40. The R^wblicans would approve of my voting in the 1988 presidential election
regardless of who I vote for. '
at ^1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much
41. To what extent would not having the voting placs in a convenient location make itdifficult for ycu persoTally to vote in the 1988 presidential election?
at all extremely
difficult 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 difficult
117
.^ 2 3 4 5 6-7
«tranaly c^te slightly neither slightly quite extxLly
42. To v*iat extent would not having an absentee haiirrt- a^.
personally to vote in the 1988 prSiSnSTScS^f difficult for you
not at aai
difficult 1 2 3 A K , extremely
^ 6 7 difficult
43. To what extent wculd not being sure where to vote make it ^personally to vote in the 1988 presidential electiS
^«ia^t for you
not at eill
difficult 1 2 3 4 «; c , extremely
* ^ 6 7 difficult
44. To what extent would lack of time make it difficult for vr.i r«>.,=««,Ti ^ ^
the 1988 presidential election?
o rr i you personally to vote in
not at all
difficult 1 2 3 4 5 6-7 ^'^H^y* ^ S 7 difficult
45. To what extent wculd feeling ill on election day make it difficult for voupersonally to vote in the 1988 presidential election?
not at eai ^ ,1.345., SIS?
presidential election?
not at all
difficult 1
extronely
difficult
47. Generally speaking, how iruch do you want to do what your parents think you should
do?
not at all i 2 3 4 5 6 7 very nuch
48. Generally speaking, hew much do you want to do what other members of your family
think you should do?
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very nuch
49. Generally speaking, ha/ much do you want to do what George Bush thinks vou should
do?
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very nuch
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ortionely <yiite sUghUy neither .^li^i ^y iB icn slightly quite extraely
50
.
cenarally speaXin,, h^^ ^ ^^ ^ ^ ^ ^^
notatedl i 2 3 4 5 ,o 7 very much
not at all 1 2
smxsrters
° / very nuch
52. Generally speaking, hcw™x*doyc«wanttodo what the De^xzrats
not at all 1 2 3 4 5
think you shculd
6 7 very ntxdi
53^^Cenerally
-Peaidi^, hc^ nuch do you vant to do v*.t Mi*ael
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 g= 07 very much
54j^G^ly speaking, hc^
12 3 4 5 6 7 very^xi.
55^^^to»rally speaking, ho«nuchdoy«iwanttodo what the Republicans think you
^ 2 3 4 5 6 7 verynu*
SS^do?"""^' ^ ^ «^ to do What Gaonge Bash's supporters think
notatalli234K/:T
-* * 5 6 7 very mich
57. I will try to vote in the 1988 presidential election.
definitely ...
,
, ^ definitely^ 1234567 no
58. To what extent is ycur voting place in a coTvenient location?
convenient 12 ± k n 1"-•^^ J4567 inocnvenient
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-ctriely c^te sUg^,
59. Hbw liJcaly is it that can Obtain an ateentae ballot^
liicely
1 2 3 4 5 e 7
60. HOW liJcaly is it that ycxa Will not Knc. wher. to cast your vote^
liJ«ly
1 2 3 4 5 6 ,
61. Hbw liJcely is it that you will lack the time to vote?
liJ«ly
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
62. HOW liJcely is it that you will feel ill on election day?
liJcaly
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
unlikely
unlikely
unlikely
unlikely
63. HOW liJcely is it that ycu will lack transportation to your votix^ place?
liJ^y 12 3 4 ^67 unlikely
pJesS2tS?aeS?on"^.5S2 o1 ^oTv^^^oT ^ - ^ -e 1.3
^ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
65. Having an ijiexperienoed or inadequate vice-president is
^1 2 3 4 5 6 7
66. Having a Danocrat as president is
2 3 4 5 6 7
disagree
bad
67. Having a Republican as president is
good 1 2 3 4 5 6
bad
bad
68. Having a president concerned about the welfare of the average American worker
•5°°^ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 bad
69. Having a president oonoemed about minority issues is
good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 bad
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extranely qu^te slig^y naiLr sli^y qoite exttiely
70. Having a president conoemed about wanen's issues is
good 1 2 3 4 5 6
71. Increasing support for corporate America is
good 1 2 3 4 5
€
72. Having a president fron Massachusetts is
good 1 2 3 4 5 6
73. Having higher taxes is
good 1 2 3 4 5 6
74. MBuntaining a sti'u» »j naticral deferse is
good 1 2 3 4 5 6
75. Continuing the current nationeLL policies is
good 1 2 3 4 5 6
76. Having an effective politician as president is
good 1 2 3 4 5 6
77. Having an experienced president is
good 1 2 3 4 5 6
bad
bad
bad
bad
bad
bad
bad
bad
78. Having a patriotic president is
good 12 3 bad
79. Having more social programs is
good 12 3 bad
80. Having policies with which I disagree is
good 1 2 3 4 5 bad
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extranely <^te sUg^y naiJher sli^y qu?te exti4^y
81. Havix^ a president who believes that elective abortion should be illegal is
good 1 2 3 4 = . _
82. Having a president v*» can maintain a strong national econcrny is
gocxl 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
83. Having a president who is tough on crime and dnigs is
good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
bad
bad
bad
84. Having an administration that favors the rich and powerful is
^ ^ 2 3 4 5 6 7 bad
85. Having a president with appealing personal characteristics is
^ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 bad
BECAUSE THIS (^JESTIC^INAIRE IS RAIHER UHGIHY AND YOU HAVE
BEEN VCKKING Of IT Ft3R QUITE SCME TIME NCW, WE SUGGEST
THAT YCXJ STOP FT3R FEW MDJUTES, REIAX AND STOETCH YOUR AWC
AND HANDS.
AFTER YCUR BREAK, PLEASE CCmTNUE ANSWERING QUESTICNS Oti
THE rounWING PAGES.
PIEASE TURN THE PAGE AND OCmTNUE WCSRKING ON THE QUESTTOINAIRE. THANK YOU.
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c^te sli*u,
86. Hew easy or difficult would it ho ^
presidential election? tor yoj to vote for Michael Dukakis in the 1988
^ ^ 7 difficult
87. I will try to vote for Michael Dukakis in the 1988 nr^s^ ^- ,n presidential electicn.
definitely
1 2 3 4 5 g
definitely
no
88. Most pecple are inportant to ne would amr^
on the 1988 presidential election. for Michael Dukakis
disagree
89. Hew nuch control do you have over votim for Mir4,=.»i rs
presidential election? Midiael Dukakis in the 1988
no
OQfTtrol 1 2 3 4 c , oonplete^67 oontrol
pLSSSi'SSS! ^""^ °' - the 1988
not at all i 2 3 4 5 «
^ ° 7 very nuch
pLSlS^StS;!' Of voti^ for Michael Dukakis in the 1988
"^"^^^
^ 2 3 4 5 6 7 verynuc*.
notatalll 2 3 45fi, _^* 3 6 7 very nuch
^L,'^*^^.^*^^^^^ approve of ny voting for Michael Dukakis in the 1988presidential election.
not at all 1 2 34t;«T
_^* ^ o 7 very nuch
S^oT^^^ approve of ray voting for Michael Dukakis in the 1988 presidential
""t^^^l 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very nuch
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. ,
.
^ * 5 6 7
ejctaranely (jute slightly neither slightly quite extraiely
S^JSoS^"^ "^"^ °^ ^"^^ ^"^^^ ^ ^ presidential
not at all 12345ct
_^* ^ o 7 very nuch
96. Other members of my family would approve of my voting for Michael Dukakis in the1988 presidential election.
"°tatall 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very nuch
97. The Republicans wculd approve of my voting for Michael Dukakis in the 1988
presidential election.
not at all very nuch
M/ voting for Michael Dukakis in the 1988 presidential election is
98. harmful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 beneficial
99. happy 1234567sad
100. wise 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 foolish
101. unpleasant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 pleasant
102. good 1234567bad
103. Most people who are important to me think I should/should not vote for Michael
Dukakis in the 1988 presidential election.
should 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 should not
104. By voting for Miciiael Dutaikis in the 1988 presidential election I will help elect
a president who can maintain a strong naticned eccncny.
likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unlikely
105. By voting for Michael Dukakis in the 1988 presidential election I will help elect
a president fran Massachusetts.
likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unlikely
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12 3 4
-—V
,4^^
It^^X^— - - X,. .^.^
^
liJcely 12 3^
^ unliJoBly
re«»JS.S2=2 SSEi- -- P-i-nU. ,
likely 12 3^
^ unlikely
^i^y
1 2 3 4 5 ,
^ unlikely
109. By votixig for Michael Dukakis in the l9flB r,«^'^a president who wUl increase social p^Si^' Presidential election I will help elect
li^y
1 2 3 4 5 6 ,
' unliJcely
110. By voting for Michael Dukakis in the 198« n«^^^ ^- ,a president who is ta^ on^S^aS dSg^ Presidential election I will help elect12 3 4 5 6,° 7 unliJcely
111. By voting for Michael Dukakis in the ignn r,«-,;^ ,an inexperie™«l or inadequSTSe^rSldS? presidential election i will help elect
li^y ^2 3 4 5 6 7^7 unlikely
112. By voting for Midiael Dukakis in the igsfl r^r^i^^^- , ,a president who will raise presidential election I will help elect
l^y 12 3 4 5 6 7^ ^ 7 unlikely
113. By voting for Michael Dukakis in the 1988 nr««irj««<.^,i i ^an experienced president. ^ ™ presidential election I will help elect
l^y 12 3 4 5 6 7^ ^ 7 unlikely
i'U^i^'^T^^.,^ wT«,^S*TS.-«^ ' "'^
likely 1 2 3 4 5 « ,^^07 unlikely
125
1 2
^tranely c^te slightly naiJher suL-i ® ^
lii-ly 1
, 3 ^
^
' unlikely
liJcely 12 3.4 5 g
' unlijceiy
li^y
1 2 3 4 5 6
*
° ' unlikely
118. By voting for Mictiael Dukakis in the 198b n«>o-^ ^•a presxdent who believes that electSe^^S^^Sl^^^f^ion I wUl help elect
li^y
1 2 3 4 5 6
'
* 7 unlikely
119. By voting for Michael Dukakis in the I9fifl ,a president oonoemed about mi^ritJ^iiSe^
®^ presidential election I will help elect
1 2 3 4 5 6 ,° 7 unlikely
120. By voting for Michael Dukakis in the 1988 nro«^H^^- , , •a president concerned about wanen's1!s22s
P* ^ election I will help elect
liJ^y 1 2 3 4 5 6^^ * 7 unlikely
121. I intend to vote for Michael IXakakis in the 1988 presidential election.12 3 4 5 6,^ ^ 7 unlikely
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.^ 2 3 4 , ,ly <^te sli^tl,
in
SikS;?"^ ^ have over voti^ for George
no
coTtrol
disagree
aish in the 1988 presidential
ocaplete
cxntrol
My voting for George Bush in the 1988 presidential election is
124. harmful 1 2 3 4 =
125.
126.
haRjy
wise
127. unpleascint
128. good
beneficicil
sad
foolish
pleasant
bad
129. I will try to vote for George Bush in the 1988 presidential election
^ 2 3 4 5 6 7
definitely
yes definitely
no
^iSnT^iSo^^^^^ in the 1988 presidential election I will help electpresident conoemed atnut- urm>n/c ^c.^-, ^ tiitactbout wcne 's issues
liJtely 12 3 4 unlikely
™iSrr^'^°f ftJsh in the 1988 presidential election I will help electpresident who is tough on crime and drugs.
liJoely
unlikely
132. By voting for George Bush in the 1988 presidential election I will help electpresident who will pranote policies with which I disagree.
likely
unlikely
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1 2
—
y
likely 1 2 3 .* 4 5 g
' unlitely
134. By votiJig for George Bush in the 1988 nr^^n^^- ,
experienoed president. ^ ^^^^ presiciential electicn I will help elect
liJcely 12345.
* 7 unliJcely
135. By voting for George Bush in the i^br r^i^^- ,
presxdent who belie;;S^t eleSi^a^SlSSS^ fiS^" ' «l«=t
litely 1 2 3 4 5 6 ,* 7 unliJcely
136. By voting for George Bush in the ignn r,»~;^ ,
Republican as president^ 1988 presidential election I will help elect a
^23456,
* 7 unliJcely
^i^^J^^T^^^j'^^ I "ill
-.p ,
1 2 3 4 1; , _
1 2 3 4 5 « ,*
^ 7 unliJcely
P^i^^wS ^ a
'"^^
' ^ ^ * 5 6 7 unliJcely
^J^i^^wS? SeSS^P^ SLSfrSS^ ^ -P ^
^ 2 3 4 5 6 7 unliJcaly
aish in the 1988 presidential electicn I will helo el«-tpresident who will maintain a stnDoj naticnkl defense. ^
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unlUcely
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^t^y *^te
" ' unlikely
143. By voting for George Bush in the 19rh r,«>» -^ ^president who will raisTtS. Presidential election I win help elect a
likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 ,*» 7 unliJcely
144. By voting for George Bush in the iqah r.^i^ ,
patriotic president. ^ ^ 1988 presidential election I will help elect a
li^y
1 2 3 4 5 6 7* 7 unlikely
'^i^o?l^^^^,^^^^^ electic X Will help elect an12 3 4 5 6,^ * 7 unlikely
SSrSy^^ ^-^^^ hectic. I wm help elect a
1 2 3 4 5 ,
unlikely
^iSStSTel'LSS'"^' "~X'^ y~ to vote for C»r,e Bush th. 19S=
' ^ ^ 5 6 7 difficult
SSS^ ~ ' shouwshould «* vrte for Geo^ Bua,
'* 5 6 7 should not
149. I intend to vote for George Bush in the 1988 presidential election.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unlikely
^iSt^S^!^'' "^"^ °' Bush in the 1988
""^^^^l 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very axil
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-ctrLaly
.^ta sli^y neikr sU^y
^i^S: iJeSS?" °* voting for Geor^ Bush in the 1988
not at all i 2 3 ^
° 7 very nuch
152. Bush supporters would approve of mr votiiw for a^rr^ ^ ^presidential election.
ung t George aish in the 1988
not at all 1 2 3 4 5
° 7 very much
153. George Bush wculd approve of my votijw for Georoe ft«h i« ^-v^ ,election. ' ^ t«3 g ajs in the 1988 presidential
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 «
•> ^ 7 very much
g^parents v^d a^rove of my voti,^ for George Bush in the 1988 presidential
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 g
** ~ very much
P^iSSSaTSSiS."^ Of my votix^ for George Bush in the 1988
•^^"^^ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very^x^
ISe^friends would approve of my voting for George Bush in the 1988 presidential
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 « -7
^ ° 7 very mLcti
SitS."^^"^ °^ ^'"^ Bush in the 1988 presidential
•^^^^^
^ 2 3 4 5 6 7 very»^
PIEASE TORN THE PAGE AND OCNTINUE
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Subject Demographics
Please answer the follc3wing questions r^^rr^;^AU of the information you prS^ CLfte^'^i^ ^^P^ °^ background,
other participants a«i NOT {jSED indiiiduSir^f ""^^ ^ information fnx.^^ -y. niank you for ycur cooperation.
1. Yc«r age: 2. Your sex (male/female)
:
3. How would you describe ycur hcmetown (check one)?:
suburb of large city
snail tcwn rural
4. Are ycu a registered voter (yes/no)?:
5. In what state is your registration?:
6. Where is your voting place located (city, state, ^ specific location if 3a«wn)?:
7. Hawe you previously voted iji any kind of election (yes/no)?:
What ki«i(s)? Please check all that apply.
8. student 9. local lo. state u. national
12. Please rate your political orientation:
liberal 1 2 3 4 5 ^ ^^ f> 7 conservative
extranely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
13. Please rate your political party identification:
^2 345
Danocrat Independent Independent Independent Republican
°™°^3nat Republican
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Final 66 Reasnn^H/intnii-T.r^
^p.^^ on Items
Please answer the questions belc, by usir^ the follown^ alternatives:
maanly false, insert a 2, and so o^PleS ^?f^^ °f it isansweri^ the questions, 'try to tS>Jc of^S^iSti^^^ r«t aait any. min than. There are no right or wro^ ansS- SJ^^^T and hew ycu typically behave
PossiJDle. ^
nswers, please try to be as careful aixj honest as
1. I generally am a logical perscn.
2. I Often have a hard ti^ imagining myself in another person's position.
— L^i^"^"" ^ ' P^^- cones to Host easily When I don't think
4. I usually think about What I want to say before I speak up in a group.
— ^"5^!^'^ °" ^ "-^^y^ °f a good reply only after it is
I^n2^ ^ appliance or itan of clothii^, i carefully cotpare theavailable alternatives in terns of price and quality. n n
7. I usually have assignments ready on time.
8. I tend to avoid activities that involve risk or darker.
9. I tend to be more enthusiastic about thii^ than the average person.
10. When necessary, I can be very assertive.
11. Most times I can feel right away when another person doesn't like me.
12. I ke^ a careful record of my expenses.
13. I have no clear idea of what my life will be like 10 years fran now.
^^-Jf?" ^
ocnpany of friends, I rarely am the one to decide what we aregoing to do.
15. When I have decided to do sanethin?, I tend to "sit on it" for a whilebefore I begin to carry it out.
16. I can easily defend both sides of an issue.
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true
— 2^*^ <'"=i« >^t p^le wui say or ^ i„ ^ ,
— ^-sS^^S^^ ^ it Zi^y to be bala^
22. I have a hard tijne naking friends.
— fil'SoS^tSS?"^ ^^ ^ ^ ic^cal thix^, „3 ^ttar ho. I
24. When getting dressed, I i^rediately what I want to «ear.
25. in nost situations, I know that what I am doii^ is right.
26. I often act inpulsively.
27. I just know intuitively when to take a *ance and when to avoid it.
— Se LSS'^ fi-d it is easy to setue disag«e„ents by reviewi^ the facts of
29. I usually have clear, explainable reasons for ray decisions.
— SstLSS!'^ find it easy to keep v^rki^ the face of t^rptix^
31. Most pecple I know are better organized than I am.
—
^isi^lI^SSi! - - Of real feeli^ rather than a consistently
— Se Si^Saie'iS' ' ^^'^^^ of
34. Once I have made a plan, I tend to follow it to its coipletion.
35. I try to make sure that my judgments are not influenced by my enotions.
^^rfS LSSr mparts things to take care of , I sonetines don't know
37. It doesn't bother me to act unrBascnably.
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Cc^letely Mainly ^^^^i^-^, ^false false partly false
_ 2;^!
have soneti^es^ cut on c^rtunities
39. I typically keep my feelings to myself.
_
40. I usually trust i.sti«:ts decidi:^ on a new cc«^
41. candidates for political office all tend to look aliJce to me.
42. I am generally on tijne for appoiittments.
43. I can typically sense right away when a person is lying.
— W f^."^ or wn«r even if I saneti^ cannot justify
—
^SSL?SSL'^ °" I usually give careful consideration to
—
^^«2Sr'u^SiS?£f?JiSS" °' ^ stick to it even if i
47. I have few strong convictions.
— Sfe^STb^iSi^^SpSSS^!^ ' ^
^
49. I can usually tell if a new song is goi^ to be a hit when I first hear it.
— righfSi^^^y^^ ^ ^ ' ^'t^ the
51. I have a tendency to act without thinking about the consequences.
52. Scnetijnes I feel that sonething is wrtang even before I get the bad news.
53. I generally don't think about tanorxow's tasks until it is tine to do them.
55. I sanetimes show too little enoticai.
56. When I wake up, I generally know right away if it will be a bad day.
57. I tend to waver back and forth before making an iaportant decision.
58. I try to weigh all the pros and oons before makii^ a decision.
59. I generally know what I want out of life and how to get it.
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60. I usually say v*iat is on my mind.
_
61. I typically knew when I have hurt scnebcxiy without having to be told.
62. I avoid interacting with ocrputere as nuch as possible.
63. I have to work at being spontaneous.
64. I usually sense right away whether a person is tn^rthy or not.
— Ssp^^^ Tr^^^.-^ P-cn, I try to «»l off before
—^ pr^L""'" °" P"'^ - deal of planning
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ENDNOTES
1.
2.
The alpha reliability coefficient for ineffectiveness
was .79 (N = 193) .
Although not conceptually of interest, the moderating
effect Of ineffectiveness was also tested via a median
split on this scale. As with the reasoned action and
intuitive action scales, no consistent pattern of
results for high ineffective versus low ineffective
subjects was obtained.
Adding evaluative candidate preference to the
constructs of the theory of planned behavior did not
significantly increase the amount of variance explained
in the intention voting difference score. This was in
contrast to the action tendency results where candidate
preference did increase the variance explained by a
statistically significant one percent for the low
reasoned action and high intuitive action subjects.
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